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This study aims to draw lessons from experiences with emissions trading programs in the 
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of the new cap-and-trade program that is scheduled to begin in July 2007 in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area in Korea. Major lessons from experiences with emissions trading 
programs in the US are as follows: well-designed cap-and-trade programs work, but they 
are not a cure-all; with respect to design, banking and minimal governmental intervention 
are needed. Initial allocations and opt-in provisions do not affect performance; for effective 
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pre-existing regulations are important. Implications for Seoul, Korea are: minimizing 
governmental intervention, relaxing the restrictions on banking, creating public auction, 
introduction of opt-in provisions, accurate and consistent monitoring, effective 
enforcement, and ccompatibility with pre-existing regulations including emissions charges 
and fuel regulations   
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I. Introduction 
Background
 Together with accelerated economic growth, rapidly increasing population and a 
higher rate of urbanization, air quality in Korea has been deteriorating over time. In 
particular, the explosive growth of vehicles in the Seoul Metropolitan Area (which takes 
up 12% of the landmass yet accounts for 46% of the population) has brought about a 
severe degradation of air quality.  The concentration of nitrogen dioxide in the region is 
about 28 to 48 percent higher than in other mega-cities including New York, London and 
Tokyo. As a result socio-economic costs related to air pollution including-- respiratory 
problem and early death-- have been estimated at 10 trillion won (approximately, 10 
billion dollars) annually.   
 In response to these air quality problems, the Korean Ministry of Environment 
(MOE) decided to introduce a total emission control (TEC) system and an emission 
trading scheme in the region as an alternative to a traditional command-and-control 
approach based on emission standards.  In December 2003, the Special Act for Seoul 
Metropolitan Air Quality Improvement was enacted, whereby a cap-and-trade system 
(targeting larger sources emitting sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides and particulate matter) 
will be in effect in Seoul City and two neighboring areas, Incheon City and Gyeonggi 
Province beginning in January 2007. 
 ２
 Since the US EPA developed its first four emissions trading programs (netting, 
offsets, bubble and banking) starting in the mid 1970s, the U.S. has led emissions trading 
programs. More recently the SO2 trading in the Acid Rain Program, the RECLAIM 
program in Los Angeles region, the NOx Budget program in Northeastern States have 
been recognized as successful examples of trading programs.      
 It seems likely that lessons from experiences with emissions trading programs in 
the U.S. would be helpful in avoiding possible waste due to trial and error in designing 
and implementing the emissions trading scheme in Seoul, Korea. Thus, this study seeks 
to draw practical implications in designing and implementation of the new emissions 
trading program in Seoul, Korea based on lessons from the U.S., given different socio-
economic, political and regulatory contexts. 
Research Questions 
 This study aims to find out major conditions and factors which are likely to 
contribute to success for the emissions trading system in Korea by drawing on lessons 
from experiences with emissions trading programs in the U.S.  
More specifically, I focus on the following three questions: 
1) Under which principles do emissions trading systems function well?  
2) What are the factors leading to success in the major emissions trading 
programs in the U.S. and what lessons can be drawn from those experiences?  
3) What are considerations to be taken into account in order to design and 
implement an emissions trading system successfully in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area, given the particular circumstances in Korea?    
 ３
 My hope is that this study will be a helpful guide for policy makers in 
designing and implementing emissions trading systems in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, 
and furthermore, it will provide insights into the nature of emissions trading systems for 
those interested in this scheme, either for scholarly or practical reasons.     
Methodology 
 In order to deal with these research questions, I have undertaken three major tasks. 
1) A literature review, involving both primary and secondary sources;   
2) Comparative case studies on  (a) The U.S. Acid Rain Program, (b) the Los 
Angeles RECLAIM program, (c) the NOx Budget program in Northeastern 
States; and 
3) A review and comparison of the U.S. and Korean institutional and legal 
settings. 
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of emissions trading programs based on an 
examination of existing documents. Since there is a huge related literature, this study 
focuses on the literatures directly dealing with at least one of my research questions.  
 Chapter 3 explains the framework for an emission trading scheme provided in the 
Special Act for Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Improvement. It includes current status of 
air pollution levels and existing air pollution regulations and major features of the 
proposed emissions trading system for the Seoul Metropolitan Areas in comparison to 
U.S. cases.   
 ４
 Chapter 4 describes the evolution of emissions trading systems in the United 
States: the U.S. EPA’s emissions trading program, the leaded gasoline phase out program, 
the Acid Rain Program, the RECLAIM program in Los Angeles Basin, and the NOx 
Budget program for the Northeastern States. Then, the chapter focuses on a comparison 
of three major trading programs with respect to their design and implementation issues:  
the Acid Rain Program, RECLAIM, and the NOx Budget program in Northeastern States. 
 Chapter 5 summarizes the analysis of the proceeding chapters. In this chapter, I 
return to the three research questions posed in the introduction. The chapter identifies 
principles guiding emissions trading programs and outline lessons learned from 
experiences with emissions trading systems in the United States. Based on lessons from 
the U.S., I suggest basic principles for success for emissions trading programs and then 
the implications of these principles for the design and implementation of the emissions 
trading program in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. Finally, this chapter also briefly 
discusses questions that are not got resolved and which will require further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ５
 
 
II. A Review of Emissions Trading Systems 
Introduction: the Past, Present and Future of Emission Trading Schemes 
The idea of an emissions trading system can be traced back to pioneering works in 
1960s by Ronald Coase and John Dales.  Based on their concept of establishing markets in 
pollution rights, a number of economists have advocated emissions trading systems as an 
alternative to the traditional command-and-control (CAC) approach or environmental taxes 
(Tietenberg, 1998; Nash, 2001; Ellerman et al., 2003). In practice, the concept of an 
emissions trading system was born in the 1970s with the policy decision by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that new emissions in non-attainment areas can 
be offset by decreased emissions from existing sources. According to the Clean Air Act of 
1970, net new emissions in non-attainment areas are prohibited, which threatens industrial 
growth in non-attainment areas (Zosel, 2000). During the 1970s, the EPA developed four 
emissions trading programs including offsets, netting, bubble, and banking based on 
emissions reduction credits (ERCs), but the experience with these earlier trading programs 
turned out to be disappointing, for a number of reasons that are now better understood.   
With the success stories of the Lead-in-Gasoline Trading Program in 1980s, the 
Acid Rain Program (ARP), and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) in 
1990s, emissions trading systems have become popular, and are now applied in a variety of 
policy arenas: air pollution control, fisheries management, water supplies, and greenhouse 
gas reduction. In fact, emissions trading programs can be cost-effective approaches by 
 ６
providing regulated sources with the flexibility to select the lowest cost alternative for 
achieving the given environmental target (Ellerman et al., 2003; Tietenberg, 2003).     
Well-designed emissions trading systems, especially cap-and-trade programs, have 
several advantages over traditional CAC approaches: environmental certainty, minimizing 
control costs and other long-term effects including innovation incentives and early 
reductions (EPA, 2003).  However, to date relatively few emissions trading programs have 
been implemented and, as in the case of the UK and Poland, poor design is likely to lead to 
the failure in some emissions trading programs. 
In spite of some of successful cases and expanded popularity of emissions trading, 
there has still been persistent ambivalence and skepticism about emissions trading 
systems primarily among policy makers and environmental groups: 
• Trades of pollution rights in the marketplace may lead to a concentration of 
permits and market power, denying small businesses and poorer people access 
rights to necessary resources; 
• Emissions trading may be seen as a way for individual firms to circumvent 
meeting required targets under an environmental policy; 
• By alleviating immediate compliance requirements for individual firms, 
emissions trading may erode short-term incentives to make necessary 
investments; and 
• Transfers involved in emissions trading may have undesirable local 
environmental consequences characterized by hotspots (OECD, 2002).  
There are several necessary conditions for cap-and-trade systems to function best: 
the environmental or health concern affects a relatively large area; a number of sources 
 ７
contribute to the environmental problem; marginal abatement costs vary across sources; 
emissions from individual sources can be measured with accuracy and consistency; and 
environmental quality and the economy is in sufficiently good condition that a cap-and-
trade program may be politically acceptable (Stavins, 2000; EPA, 2003).  Despite 
surprising successes in the U.S., political feasibility, uncertainty about technological 
development, higher transaction costs and environmental injustice can be obstacles to 
success in emissions trading programs (Thompson, 2000; Solomon and Lee, 2000).  Colby 
(2000) and Thompson (2000) argue that strong regulations are often necessary before the 
implementation of an emission trading program because pre-existing regulations can 
determine the critical emissions trading cap.     
While it is not a panacea and still has a long way to go, an emissions trading system 
can be an effective approach with several advantages, especially considering the fact that 
emissions trading programs have been used in problematic areas in which traditional 
instruments had not achieved environmental performance at low enough cost. Actually, 
cap-and-trade programs, advanced forms of emissions trading, have not only 
complemented the existing regulations, but have also supplanted them in some cases 
(Tietenberg, 2004; Ellerman, 2004). 
The application areas for cap-and-trade programs have been extended from 
traditional uses-- such as air pollution management and limiting fisheries catches-- to new 
areas including climate change, renewable energy transport, transportation, solid waste 
management, and water resources management (OECD, 2002). As Ellerman et al. (2000) 
point out, however, an emissions trading program is not an effective option when: (a) in a 
specific, isolated plant which emits toxic chemicals which cause serious risk to 
 ８
neighboring residents; (b) it is expensive or impractical to measure actual emissions or 
to enforce trading.  
 With respect to future development, the following topics need to be considered 
for further clarifications: (a) emissions trading schemes can be expanded into a number of 
policy areas beyond traditional areas such as air pollution control and fisheries 
management; (b) seeing that, in many cases, emissions trading programs primarily cover 
larger stationary sources, other regulations covering mobile or smaller stationary sources 
can be needed to achieve a given environmental goal; and (c) in order to enhance cost-
savings by  expanding affected sources, emissions trading programs can be developed 
incorporating inter-source trading between mobile and stationary sources and inter-
pollutant trading between NOx, SOx, and particulate matter (Kosobud, 2000) 
Types of Emissions Trading 
In general, emissions trading programs can be classified into three types: cap and 
trade, project-based trading (offset program), and rate-based trading (averaging program). 
All of three trading types have similar rationale: trading provides sources with flexibility to 
develop cost-effective emissions reduction options to achieve a given objective.  
Under cap-and-trade programs, the regulator sets a cap on total emissions which is 
divided into the same amount of allowances (right to emit a unit of a pollutant), and 
allocates allowances to each source. Each source must hold allowances to cover its 
cumulative annual emissions by the end of compliance year, with allowances traded among 
sources.   
 ９
Project-based trading provides tradable credits to facilities that reduce emissions 
more than required by pre-existing regulations (“baseline”). These credits must be created 
through pre-approval by regulating authority before they can be traded.  Under rate-based 
trading, under a given emissions rate (“performance standard”) set by the authority, 
emitting sources can earn credits automatically if they keep their average emissions rates 
below the performance standard. Unlike project-based trading, there is no pre-approval of 
trading in rate-based trading. A rate-based trading program could be a preparatory tool for a 
further cap-and-trade program (Kosobud, 2000; EPA, 2003; Ellerman et al., 2003).     
The success of all three types of emissions trading relies on the following 
preconditions: there must be emissions control requirement in place; there must be 
differences in marginal abatement costs among regulated sources; and there must be 
accurate measurement of emissions and reliable enforcement of permit coverage (Ellerman 
et al., 2003)  
Table 1. Comparison of Three Forms of Trading System 
Category Potential to LimitTotal Emissions 
Cost 
Minimization 
Administrative & 
Transaction Costs Applied Cases 
Cap and Trade High Yes Low 
- The Acid Rain Program 
- RECLAIM 
- The NOx Budget Trading
Project-based 
Trading Low to Medium Yes High - Offset program 
Rate-based 
Trading Medium Yes Low to Medium 
 - Lead-in-Gasoline 
Trading Program 
               Source: “Tools of the Trade: A Guide to Designing and Operating a Cap and Trade Program for 
Pollution Control,” June 2003 EPA 
In terms of three criteria: potential to limit total emissions, cost minimization, and 
administrative and transaction costs, a cap-and-trade program can be preferable because it 
 １０
can achieve given total emissions reductions more cost-effectively with lower 
administrative and transaction costs rather than project-based or rate-based trading (EPA 
2003). Stavins (2000) also suggests that if possible, a cap-and-trade scheme based on a 
firm’s total emissions should be adopted rather than other forms of trading programs.   
Comparing Emissions Trading with Other instruments 
Policy instruments for dealing with environmental problems can be classified into 
these three categories: economic incentives approaches, such as environmental taxes and 
emissions trading; command-and-control approaches, such as technology mandates or 
emissions rate standards; and non-regulatory approach, such as voluntary agreements and 
eco labeling. The conditions under which CAC regulations work best are as follows: 
limited emission reduction experience by regulators and firms, clearly defined solutions 
in terms of financial and technical terms, direct monitoring which is not feasible, and 
emissions containing toxic substances or serious localized health impacts (EPA, 2003).  
According to the 2002 OECD guidelines, the criteria for choosing between 
emissions trading and taxes are related to characteristics of market structure, 
organizational and transaction costs, and redistribution: Taxes are more appropriate if 
agents are in fact sensitive to prices, organizational and transaction cost for a new trading 
scheme would be excessive, and the loss of pre-existing tax revenue with an introduction 
of new emissions trading would be large. In terms of considerations for marginal firms, 
while environmental tax break provides no incentive to abate emissions, a free initial 
allocation of allowances under a cap-and-trade program still provides incentive to reduce 
emissions.  
 １１
On the other hand, another approach for reducing emissions-- voluntary 
approaches-- have been introduced to provide regulated firms with more flexibility in 
achieving environmental targets and the approaches based on voluntary agreement reflect 
the concerns about competitiveness of industries by not imposing compulsory 
regulations. In fact, voluntary approaches have been used in a policy mix to supplement 
other regulations such as taxes and emissions trading programs (OECD, 2002). 
As Figure 1 shows, an emissions trading system leads to the cost minimizing 
allocations without going through a trial-and-error process, as would an emissions tax 
program. As a result, the greater are differences in marginal abatement costs across firms, 
the bigger are the gains due to an emissions trading scheme. Suppose that the source 1 
was allocated with 7 permits and source 2 was allocated with 8 permits given 15 units of 
uncontrolled emissions.  
In this example, both sources would have incentive to trade each other because 
they can reduce their marginal abatement costs through a trade. The marginal abatement 
cost (C) for source 2 is higher than that (A) for source 1. The source 2 could lower its 
cost if it could buy tradable permits from source 1 at a price lower than C. At the same 
time, the source 1 could reduce its abatement cost if it could sell tradable permits to 
source 2 at a price higher than A. Until the permit price reaches B, a trade of permits 
would happen. At the point of B in which the marginal abatement cost of two sources 
would be the same and there would be no incentive to trade further (Tietenberg, 2003; 
EPA, 2003).  
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Figure 1. Economic Logic of Emissions Trading Scheme 
MC1 
MC2 
A 
B 
C
Marginal Cost 
($/unit) 
Quantity of 
emissions reduced
Source 1   0        1        2        3        4        5        6        7       8       9      10      11     12      13      14      15 
 15      14      13      12      11      10       9        8       7       6       5        4       3        2       1        0     source 2       
Source: Tietenberg (2003)  
There are a number of papers that compare emissions trading systems with 
environmental taxes. The main difference between an environmental tax and emissions 
trading rests on whether prices or quantities are controlled. For example, with a carbon 
tax, the size of the carbon tax per unit emitted is fixed and the quantity of carbon emitted 
is adjusted. In an emissions trading, on the other hand, the quantity of emissions is fixed 
and the price of the emission permits takes up the slack. In theory, environmental taxes 
and emissions trading can have the same overall effects in terms of reducing pollution at 
least cost , but in practice, they differ significantly because information about marginal 
damages and marginal costs is not known in advance (Kosobud, 2000; Ekins etc., 2002; 
Gruber, 2005).    
Weitzman (1974) has shown that (1) it is preferable to set the price when there is 
uncertainty over the control cost function, and a possibility that the control cost is very 
 １３
sensitive to greater-than-optimal emissions reduction, and (2) it is preferable to fix 
the quantity when there is uncertainty about the damage function, and a possibility that 
the damage is very sensitive to greater-than-optimal emissions. Gruber (2005) shows that 
the steeper the marginal damage curve, the more preferable emissions trading is rather 
than taxation in terms of deadweight loss. Suppose two examples of externalities: global 
warming and nuclear leakage. Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows the case of global warming 
with fairly flat marginal damage curve. If the costs are uncertain, taxation at the level of c 
would produce much lower deadweight loss (DBE) than would quantity-based regulation 
of R1 (ABC). On the other hand, in the case of nuclear leakage with very steep marginal 
damage curve as shown panel (b), taxation would bring about a much larger deadweight 
loss (DBE) than would quantity-based regulation of R1 (ABC).    
Figure 2. Comparison of Environmental Tax and Emissions Trading System  
a) Example 1: Global warming (with fairly flat marginal damage curve) 
 １４
Cost of 
reduction 
Actual MC
Estimated MC
   R1 
Mandated
C
BD
E
R2R3
A
MD
Reduction
Tax c 
 
b) Example 2: Nuclear leakage (with steeper Marginal damage curve) 
 
Cost of 
reduction 
Actual MC
Estimated MC
Reduction
D
A
B
MD 
Tax c E
C
Source: Gruber (2005) 
   R1 
Mandated
R2R3
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Tietenberg (1998) argues that tradable permits are preferable in the case of 
changes in external circumstances, like a growing economy, while emission charges are 
preferable when technological progress is likely to shift the marginal abatement cost 
downward.  In practice, existing environmental tax rates are usually too low to have the 
necessary incentive effect, and increasing the tax rate is likely to raise political opposition 
so that emissions charges complement, but do not replace traditional emission standards 
(OECD, 2004).     
Design Issues 
The major features of an emissions trading program can be classified into two broad 
categories: design issues and implementation issues. While design issues can include 
allocation of allowances, geographical or temporal flexibility, trading market, and 
relationship with pre-existing regulations, implementation issues involve monitoring, 
compliance and enforcement (Harrison, 1999; Ellerman et al., 2003; EPA 2003).   
 A. Allocation of allowances 
One of the most controversial decisions in an emissions trading program is how to 
allocate emission permits or allowances. Among a great number of possible methods, 
grandfathered allocations or auctions are usually discussed. In general, these two methods 
tend to provide the same incentives for emissions reductions and, as a result, produce the 
same environmental outcome. However, the distributional impacts are different. Auctions 
transfer resources from emitters to the government and therefore yield government 
 １６
revenue. However, grandfathering approaches merely give valuable assets, in the 
form of tradable property rights, to polluters (Ekins and Barker, 2002). 
Many researchers argue that grandfathering is the possible best option for several 
reasons: political feasibility and respecting the current producers’ investments. Allocative 
efficiency, in terms of a cost minimizing distribution of abatement responsibility, can be 
achieved regardless of the initial allocations among sources (Tietenberg, 1998; Ellerman 
et al., 2000; Kosobud, 2000; Ekins and Barker., 2002). On the other hand, some 
researchers are in favor of auctions in that revenues earned from auctions can be recycled 
to reduce other distortional taxes and therefore increase economic efficiency. Auctions 
also give fair access to emissions markets for small sources and new entrants, and remove 
the need for controversial decisions over permit allocations (Cramton and Kerr, 1998; 
Goulder et al., 1999). Also, Kling and Zhao (2000) argue that auctioned and free 
allocations have different long-run efficiency complications depending on the nature of 
the pollution (or the shape of the pollution damage function) using the following model 
of efficient proportion of free permits:  
e0 єn
e = 1 - єd 
where  
e0 = amount of free permits, 
e = actual emission,   
єn = the elasticity of pollution damage with respect to the number of firms, 
and єd = the elasticity of pollution damage with respect to each firm’s emission. 
In the case of uniformly mixed pollutants with linear damage function (єn = єd), 
only the total emissions matter so that all permits should be auctioned. On the other hand, 
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for the local pollutants which cause environmental damage in a specific area, the 
damage function of a firm is increasing and convex (єn < єd), which result in free 
allocation of some of permits. 
Without transaction costs, the initial allocations could not affect the final 
allocations. However, in the presence of transaction costs, an accurate initial allocation is 
crucial in efficiency of a trading program. If transaction costs are substantial, not just 
transfer, then the transaction costs means a deadweight loss included in the total cost of 
an emissions trading system. Consider that as market matures, the long-term marginal 
transaction costs are constant, it is important that regulators should allocate more 
allowances to regulated firms with higher marginal abatement costs in order to minimize 
the overall costs of emissions trading (Cason and Gangadharan, 2003).    
In dealing how to allocate allowances, distributional considerations, especially for 
low-income groups, should probably be taken into account. In theory, an emissions 
trading system offers a costless trade-off between efficiency and equity so that the initial 
allocation could be used to deal with equity issues without sacrificing efficiency. In 
practice, too great a concern about political feasibility often leads to adopting the method 
of grandfathering, which does not solve equity problems (Tietenberg, 1998).  In terms of 
fairness of permits allocation, the allocating methods including baseline years should not 
be unfavorable to firms who have invested a lot in emission abatement prior to the 
introduction of an emissions trading system, or those who have suffered business 
recessions in the industry (Kosobud, 2000; OECD, 2002). 
Another contentious issue related to allocation of allowances concerns defining 
the nature of allowances. Allowances should be treated as property rights, in order to 
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protect incentives they create for firms to invest in pollution reduction. Meanwhile, 
as environmental groups argue, air is common property shared by all people so that air 
itself should not be transferred into private ownership. A practical solution to this issue 
can be a compromise that permit-holders are given some security with respect to their 
allocation of allowances, but this security does not amount to a full property right. In the 
Acid Rain Program, an allowance represents a limited authorization to emit sulfur 
dioxide. This is not a true property right but it seems to be functionally akin to property 
right (Tietenberg, 1998; EPA, 2003)   
  
 
B. Geographical or Temporal Flexibility 
Allowances should be traded with few restrictions because any restrictions can 
impede the market function and then reduce the cost savings that come with maximum 
flexibility. In many cases, however, there are two types of restrictions on allowance 
trading: geographical restrictions, and temporal restrictions.  
Geographic or spatial restrictions are often a concern with non-uniformly mixing 
pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide. Trading of local or regional 
pollutants may lead to excessive pollution concentrations at particular locations, which 
may create hotspots or local violations of ambient air quality standards (Tietenberg, 
2003; Nash and Revesz 2001).   
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In addition to hotspots, local concentrations of pollution may raise 
environmental justice concerns because dirty or older sources are likely to be situated in 
lower income neighborhoods. The problem is that while geographic restrictions help 
solve or reduce these problems, these restrictions will increase transaction costs as well. 
Therefore, less restrictive alternatives can be applied: (1) regulatory tiering is provided by 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. If a trading would result in a violation of a 
pre-existing air quality standard, the trade would be not allowed; (2) zoning, like the 
RECLAIM two-trading zone program, is more restrictive in that it divides the trading 
areas into specific zones and trades can be allowable within specified zones; (3) under 
differentiated trading ratios, a trade might require a greater than 1:1 ratio when there are 
risky circumstances (Solomon, 2000; Nash and Revesz, 2001). 
According to a study of the Acid Rain Program there were no critical hotspots or 
excessive pollution concentrations in specific areas (contrary to environmentalists’ 
concerns) because SO2 emissions were reduced by half and the overlapping pre-existing 
regulations like the New Source Review prevent excessive pollution concentrations in 
specific areas (Kosobud, 2000; Ellerman et al., 2000).  
 Temporal restrictions (restrictions on banking and borrowing) are another 
transferability rule that can hinder the use of allowances. Although banking has many 
advantages, such as encouraging early emission reductions and removing price volatility, 
it can also have disadvantages like delaying the achievement of the emissions target. 
Likewise, borrowing can be helpful in smoothing out price spikes in allowances, but it 
may have a great risk of future non-compliance in case firms borrowing allowances face 
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financial troubles and try to avoid repayment of allowances (Tietenberg, 2003; 
Ellerman et al., 2003; EPA 2003).    
While the ARP permits individual firms to bank(save) their allowances,  but it 
does not permit them to borrow(use in advance) their allowances, RECLAIM has no 
banking or borrowing, but it gives a very limited temporal flexibility through the use of 
two overlapping allowance cycles. In the NOx Budget Trading Program, banking is 
permitted but there are automatic limits imposed on the use of banked allowances when 
the banked allowances reach a certain level; i.e. there is no incentive to save more than a 
certain number of allowances. 
Unlike the ARP, the very limited kind of banking system of RECLAIM leads to 
difficulties beginning in 2000. In the summer of 2000, the price for NOx RTC 
skyrocketed to more than $45,000 per ton, which was some ten times higher than it was 
in 1999. As a result of the high NOx RTC prices, coupled with deregulation of electricity 
markets in California, overall NOx emissions exceeded the cap for 2000 by about 6 
percent (after taking advantage of limited banking or borrowing opportunities). In 
response, the South Coast Air Quality Management District (“SCAQMD”) changed 
RECLAIM rules, whereby electricity generators were temporarily suspended from 
participating in the RECLAIM and instead, they submitted compliance plans and paid 
mitigation fees ($15,000 per ton) for excess emissions in 2000 and 2001 (Tietenberg, 
2003; Harrison 2004).  
In the case of the ARP during the phase I (1995 to 1999), overinvestment in 
scrubbers was due to the rapid expansion of low-sulfur coal from the Powder River Basin 
(PRB) in Wyoming and thus, much more emissions reduction occurred beyond what was 
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required to meet the phase I cap. However, this unexpected surprise (exogenous 
uncertainty) didn’t matter because reductions could be saved for the future use through 
the available banking mechanism (Ellerman et al., 2000).   
  C. Trading Market 
Emissions trading markets are efficient or well-functioning under these situations: 
a single market price of allowance, low transactions costs, sufficient opportunities for 
arbitrage, and active participation in trading (Ellerman et al., 2000). In the case of the 
ARP, the key design elements were that de facto rights to emit SO2 were being traded, 
rather than reductions in SO2 emissions relative to a baseline, and that each allowance 
was worth the same amount regardless of when or between whom it was traded. In order 
to facilitate trading, the EPA gave up reviewing and approving trades in the process of 
emissions trading which resulted in lower transaction cost. The EPA also  administered 
an allowance auction (having 2.8 percent retired of all allocated allowances each year) to 
encourage the identification of a single market price and the development of a private 
market (Ellerman et al., 2000).  
Brokers and individual speculators have participated actively in emissions trading 
programs such as the ARP and RECLAIM, which has contributed to thick markets 
(Ellerman et al., 2000; Harrison, 2004). As well as emitting facilities and brokers, public 
participation (including environmental groups) in purchasing and retiring allowances can 
help meet the environmental objective (Tietenberg, 2004). 
Too-high allowance prices are likely to hinder emissions trading markets. In 
RECLAIM, the price spike in NOx RTC during 2000 to 2001 lead to a temporary 
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suspension of the program and a return to a traditional CAC approach involving a 
mitigation fee.  In the ARP, on the other hand, prices for allowances during Phase I were 
stable with prices varying between $100 and $200. Furthermore, actual price of 
allowances was lower than expected prior to the implementation of the program for 
several reasons: initial over-investment in scrubbers triggered by high expected 
allowances prices, and unexpected availability of cheap low-sulfur coal from the Powder 
River Basin in Wyoming due to the deregulation of rail transportation (Ellerman et al., 
2000). 
 
 
Figure 3. NOx RTC Prices in RECLAIM (1999-2004) 
 
    Source: South Coast Air Quality Management District (2005) 
Figure 4. SO2 Allowance Prices in the Acid Rain Program (1995-2005) 
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ssions trading markets, two types of market power are usually identified: 
zing manipulation-- capacity to influence the transaction price of traded 
xclusionary manipulation-- by which a commodity producer hoards permits 
ket entry by competitors (OECD, 2001). In a laboratory test-bed study for 
 in emissions trading, Cason et al. (2003) show that in a double auction 
onopoly or duopoly firm cannot dominate an emissions trading market, so 
umes traded are closer to the competitive equilibrium than the monopoly 
   
D. Relationship with Pre-existing Regulations 
 policy measure can be born in a vacuum. For a new instrument to be 
hould be compatible with pre-existing regulatory vehicles. According to the 
ere are several points to be kept in mind when considering the integration of 
methods with other policy approaches:  first, a CAC approach can be 
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compatible with a cap-and-trade program but there should not be contradictions or 
duplications; second, integration with a CAC regulation can help prevent the creation of 
hotspots; third, in terms of compatibility with other trading programs, allowances from a 
cap-and-trade program can be interchangeable with offsets from project-based programs or 
credits from rate-based programs only if those offsets or credits do not detract from the 
environmental effectiveness of the cap-and-trade program.  
Ellerman (2002) suggests two ways in which to use a pollution fee to reinforce a 
tradable permit system: (1) a higher second-tier penalty rate-- an emitting firm would 
surrender allowances and pay the low pollution fee for all covered emissions, and the 
higher penalty for uncovered emissions; and (2) the first tier of the pollution fee as a second 
instrument for achieving local air quality standards -- within the sensitive areas, the level of 
pollution fee is higher.    
The earlier EPA’s emission trading programs were based on the existing 
regulations which intended to facilitate or complement the existing regulatory scheme. 
However, recent cap and trade programs, such as the SO2 trading in the ARP and 
RECLAIM, are likely to intend to replace technology-based or emissions standards 
(Tietenberg 1998)     
Unlike successes in the U.S., failures of emissions trading programs in the UK and 
Poland were due to incompatibility with existing regulatory regimes. In particular, sulfur 
trading in the UK is understood to have failed for these six reasons:  
(1) Independent development in energy industry-- privatization of British Gas, 
monopoly supplier of gas, in 1986 and privatization of the England and Wales ESI, a 
dominant electricity company, in 1991-- led to drop in gas price, switch to gas turbine from 
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coal -fired system, and reduction in sulfur emissions. As a result, without additional 
efforts, including the quota switching system (1992 to 1996), regulated sources could easily 
achieve sulfur reduction targets. Quota switching had become redundant; (2) a conflict of 
regulatory principles between the quota switching system and the pre-existing integrated 
pollution control (IPO). In other words, IPC requires the concept of best available 
technology not entailing excessive costs (BATNEEC) based on authorization of technical 
requirements, which is not likely to be compatible with the quota switching system based 
on cap-and-trade; (3) a conflict of regulatory cultures between the U.S. and the Europe. 
While regulations in the U.S. use uniform standards, those in UK are flexible and informal 
through negotiations. Therefore, emissions trading initiated by the Department of 
Environment was regarded as a complicated government intervention; (4) a conflict over 
quota allocation among participants; (5) uncertainty of trading regulations including the 
variable targets for the UNECE’s sulfur protocol; (6) inadequate political support: both 
industries and environmentalists opposed the introduction of a new emissions trading 
system (Sorrell, 1999; Zylicz, 1999).  
Implementation Issues 
 A. Monitoring  
One of the most distinctive features of a cap-and-trade program is that sources 
measure total emissions with the most possible accuracy and consistency because the 
emission measurements are the so-called “gold standard” upon which a trading market can 
operate (EPA, 2003). For example, continuous emissions monitoring system (CEMS) and 
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the allowance tracking system (ATS) were two major implementation tools 
contributing to success of the SO2 trading in the ARP. In the ARP, even though the CEMS 
added administrative costs (about 7% of the total compliance costs), it helped encourage 
more emissions trading and greater cost savings (Ellerman et al., 2000; Kruger et al., 2000) 
 B. Compliance and Enforcement 
Enforcement is essential for success of emissions trading programs because the 
ultimate gains from emissions trading depend on rates of compliance. Stranlund et al. 
(2002) claim that penalties should be higher than prevailing permit (allowance) prices 
and they should be applied automatically in case of non-compliance based on these two 
conditions for complete compliance;  
1. the marginal benefit of under-reporting, which is the price of permits, is not 
greater than the expected marginal cost (p < π × [f + g])  
 
             where  
                    p: price of permits; π: probability of being caught; f: fine for violators;      
                    and g: fine for under-reported emissions.   
2. fines imposed on each violator should be greater than the market price of 
permits (p < f) 
 Levels of sanctions are important: penalties should be neither too large nor too 
small. Insufficient penalties lead to non-compliance. Too large a penalty will not be 
credible for compliance. As a good example, the penalty in the ARP is 2,000 dollars per 
ton of excess SO2 emissions, while the marginal abatement costs approximately 700 
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dollars per ton (Stavins, 2000).
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III. The Framework for Air Pollution Control in Korea 
General Context 
A.  Development of Air Policy Institution 
Before delving into specific air pollution control policies in Korea, this study starts 
with the development of Korea’s air pollution control laws. To deal with potential 
environmental problems caused by rapid government-driven industrialization since the mid 
1960s, the Environmental Pollution Preservation Act (the first environmental law except 
for the Waste Cleaning Act of 1961) was enacted in 1963. However, it was not sufficient 
for handling environmental problems for several reasons: The law did not go into effect 
until 1969 its coverage, with only 21 articles, was very limited, and enforcement was 
completely inadequate.     
In 1977, with the rising environmental concerns, the Environmental Conservation 
Law replaced the Environmental Pollution Preservation Act. While the previous law dealt 
with municipal and industrial pollution, the new law included new measurements, such as 
environmental impact assessment, disposal of industrial waste, and preservation of the 
natural environment.  
With the introduction of the idea that citizens have a right to clean and healthy 
environment in Korea’s constitutional amendments of 1980, diversified environmental 
problems and increasing environmental concerns help divide and specialize the 
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Environmental Conservation Law into six laws, including the Clean Air Conservation 
Act, Noise and Vibration Control Act, and the Clean Water Conservation Act. Afterwards, 
the Indoor Air Quality Management Act (2003) and the Special Act for Seoul Metropolitan 
Air Quality Improvement (2003), and the Foul Odor Prevention Act (2004) was 
promulgated and as of now, five air policy related laws has been put into place.  
To cope with rapidly increasing air pollution emissions, under the Ministry of 
Environment (MOE), there has been established one bureau named Air Quality 
Management which includes six divisions (including Area Based Air Quality Management, 
Environmental Transportation Policy, and Metropolitan Air Quality Management District).   
 B. Overview of Existing Air Pollution Control Measurements 
The degradation of air quality caused by fast-growing industrial activities and the 
soaring number of vehicles has been one of the most serious concerns in Korea during the 
unprecedented economic and social growth that has occurred in the country since the mid-
1960s. In particular, air-pollution has concentrated in major cities like Seoul and as a result, 
health concerns including respiratory diseases and the rate of early death have steadily 
increased over time1.    
In response, the MOE established ambient air quality standards for six major air 
pollutants beginning with sulfur dioxide in 1979, based upon which it has implemented 
several air pollution control measures.  
 
 
 
1 According to the MOE, brain stroke caused by air pollution may have aggravated the death rate by six 
percent 
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Table 2. Comparison of Ambient Air Quality Standards between Korea and the US 
Category Standards in Korea Standards in the US 
SO2  
Annual average 
24-hour average 
1-hour average 
 
0.02 ppm 
0.05 ppm 
0.15 ppm 
 
0.03 ppm 
0.14 ppm 
0.50 ppm (3-hour avg) 
CO 
8-hour average 
1-hour average 
 
9 ppm 
25 ppm 
 
9 ppm 
35 ppm 
NO2 
Annual average 
24-hour average 
1-hour average 
 
0.05 ppm 
0.08 ppm 
0.15 ppm 
 
0.053 ppm 
N/A 
N/A 
PM10 
Annual average 
24-hour average 
 
70µg/m³ 
150µg/m³ 
 
50µg/m³ 
150µg/m³ 
PM2.5 
Annual average 
24-hour average 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 
15µg/m³ 
65µg/m³ 
O3  
8-hour average 
1-hour average 
 
0.06 ppm 
0.1 ppm 
 
0.08 ppm 
0.12 ppm 
Lead (Pb) 
Annual average 
 
0.5 µg/m³ 
 
1.5 µg/m³ (Quarterly avg) 
Source: Environmental White Book in Korea (2005), Tietenberg (2002) 
In general, pollution control measures in Korea can be classified into three 
categories: facility emissions controls, fuel regulations and vehicle exhaust controls.  
1. Facility emissions controls  
Emissions controls on stationary industrial sources began with the enactment of the 
Environmental Conservation Law in 1977, and have been strengthened over time. The 
major regulations in effect consist of the following four tools: emissions standards, 
emissions charges, controls for severely polluted industrial areas, and a tele-monitoring 
system (TMS) for continuous emissions monitoring. 
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In order to control emissions from industrial sites, such as sulfur dioxide and 
particulate matter, the MOE has set an emission standard on each pollutant. While ambient 
air quality standards refer to an administrative target to be achieved, emissions standards 
indicate legal requirements to be met by each pollution source. The emission standard on 
nitrogen oxide were first set in 1979, followed by the standards on carbon monoxide, 
nitrogen dioxide, dust, ozone, and hydrocarbons in 1983, and lead in 1991. These were 
further strengthened in 1993 by establishing new standards on sulfuric acid gas and 
hydrocarbon. As of 2005, emissions standards are applied to twenty-eight air pollutants and 
their standards have been strengthened gradually considering the development of 
technology and financial feasibility. Furthermore, industrial sources are categorized into 
five types according to the amount of their annual pollution discharge, so as to enhance 
control over larger sources.  
Emissions charges are a major powerful tool to induce each source to comply with 
emissions standards. In the cases of sulfur dioxide and PM10, regulators impose a general 
charge according to the quantity of emissions and also an additional charge based on the 
extent to which each source exceeds the emissions standard. When the quantities of 
emissions are less than 30 percent of the allowed amounts, the firm is exempt from the 
general emissions charge. For the other 10 pollutants, including NH3 and HCL, pollutant-
specific emissions charges are imposed on firms which exceed the emissions standard for 
each pollutant.    
In severely polluted areas, special plans for air quality are implemented. In two 
larger industrial complexes designated as Special Control Areas, more rigorous (for 
existing sources) or special emissions standards (for new sources) are applied and strict 
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equipment requirement for reducing emissions are imposed on these sources. Another 
category of specially managed areas is designed as Air Pollution Control Areas, and this 
term is applied to a region where more than 30% of monitored point sources exceed 80% of 
ambient air quality standards. If an area is designated as an Air Pollution Control Area (as 
of 2005, these include the Seoul Metropolitan Area, Busan City, Daegu City, and the 
Gwang-yan Bay Area), the city or province has to prepare and submit its 5-year 
Implementation Plan to the MOE.  Meanwhile, because part of a current Air Pollution 
Control Area overlaps with the Seoul Metropolitan Area in the Special Act for the Seoul 
Metropolitan Air Quality Improvement, the Seoul Metropolitan Area covered by the 
special act should be exempt from regulations associated with Air Pollution Control Areas.       
In order to clearly understand air quality status and to secure basic date required for 
the establishment of improvement measures, the MOE and local governments have 
installed and operated a total of 10 monitoring networks to keep track of national and 
regional ambient air quality data, as well as the levels of heavy metals and photo-chemical 
substances in the ambient air.  
There were 372 monitoring stations operating in Korea as of April 2004. In 
addition, like the CEMS in the U.S., a Tele-Monitoring System (TMS) has also been 
installed in the individual smoke stacks of high-emission facilities since February 2002. 
Based on the information collected by the TMS, the MOE mandates improvements and 
imposes charges on those who exceed emission standards. As of January 2004, TMS units 
were installed in 1,841 stacks at 317 industrial sites.  
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2. Fuel regulations  
One of the regulatory tools widely used in Korea is fuel regulations. To date, in 
order to minimize air pollution resulting from fuel usage, three types of fuel regulations 
have been employed: a ban on the use of solid fuels such as coals, and expanding the use of 
low-sulfur oil and clean gas fuels like LNG. Since 1981, the use of low-sulfur oil has 
steadily increased, reducing the amount of sulfur dioxide in urban areas. As of 2005, the 
sulfur content of heavy oil has been limited to less than 1 percent (nationwide), 0.5 percent 
(in 56 mid-sized cities) or 0.3 percent (in Seoul and twenty other major cities). In addition, 
the sulfur content of light oil is restricted to less than 0.1 percent nationwide.  
Meanwhile, the use of solid fuels such as coal and charcoal has been prohibited in 
areas where ambient air quality standards have been continuously threatened since 1985.  
Regulated entities include apartments and power plants in the Seoul Metropolitan Areas, 
but some of facilities (such as steel and cement production) can be exempt under 
exceptions that are approved by the MOE. Air quality had not been significantly improved 
in spite of the introduction of the above two fuel regulations. Thus, mandatory use of clean 
fuel was introduced in 1988, just before the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Regulated facilities 
include apartments, boilers and electric generating units (EGUs) in Seoul and 36 other large 
cities.     
3. Vehicle exhaust control 
Air pollution emissions come from vehicles account for about 79 percent of carbon 
monoxide (CO), 43.6 percent of nitrogen oxides (NOx), and 31 percent of fine particulate 
matter (PM10). In particular, NOx, particulate matter and volatile organic compound 
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(VOC) stemming from vehicles are major contributors to levels of urban smog so that 
strict control efforts are needed, especially in urban areas.   
  Efforts are also being made to fundamentally reduce air pollution from mobile 
sources, which is the highest contributor to air quality degradation. (In the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area alone, roughly 67% of PM10 and 51% of NOx are from vehicle 
exhaust.) The MOE has set an exhaust emission standard for newly manufactured vehicles, 
and for in-use vehicles, in addition to fuel production standards. In particular, starting in 
2006, emission standards on newly manufactured gasoline and natural gas vehicles were 
strengthened to the level of ultra low emission vehicle (ULEV) and emission standards on 
diesel vehicles was also intensified to the level of EURO-42.  
 The MOE has started operating natural gas vehicles (NGVs) as replacements for 
diesel buses that have long operating lives and high emissions discharges. As of May 2004, 
4,876 diesel buses owned by private sector were replaced with NGVs, and 20,000 diesel 
vehicles, which account for 48% of the total diesel vehicles nationwide, will be replaced 
with NGVs by 2007. Also, as a policy to control in-use diesel vehicles that are not subject 
to mandatory replacement, the MOE is promoting another project to encourage the 
attachment of Diesel Particulate Filters (DPF) and Diesel Oxidation Catalysts (DOC).  
 C. Context of the Special Act on Seoul Air Quality Improvement 
With a population of some 48 million, Korea has the third highest population 
density in the world at 468 persons per square kilometer. In addition, population pressure, 
accelerated economic growth within a short span of time since the mid 1960s has led to a 
 
2  ULEV for gasoline cars has been applied in the US since 2004, and EURO-4 for diesel vehicles started to 
be applied in EU countries in 2006.    
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rapid increase in environmental pollution. There has also been considerable social 
conflict surrounding various large-scale development projects such as dams and highways.   
 In particular, with the explosive growth of population and vehicles in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area, this region which takes up just 11.8 percent of the total national 
landmass accounts for 46 percent of the total population and vehicles. Seoul’s population 
density is approximately 4 times higher than that of the rest of the nation. Taken together, 
this excessive concentration of population and vehicles in a relatively smaller area has 
brought about a severe deterioration in Seoul’s air quality.   
Table 3. Population and Vehicles in the Seoul Metropolitan Area 
Time 1990 2000 Growth Rate 
Population 18,340,000 21,910,000 20% 
Number of Vehicles 1,790,000 5,577,000 211% 
Source: Unpublished paper by the MOE 
Pollution levels of particulate matter and nitrogen oxides in the Seoul Metropolitan 
area are 1.7 to 3.5 times higher than those in other major cities globally, and is higher than 
other cities in Korea as well, which results in enormous social costs estimated at 
approximately 10 trillion Won (10 billion USD) annually. 
Table 4. Comparison of Air Pollution between Seoul and Other cities 
Category Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) Particulate Matters (PM) 
Seoul (2001) 37 71 
London (2001) 25 20 
Paris (2001) 22 20 
Tokyo (2000) 29 49 
New York (1997) 30 28 
Other areas in Korea (2001) 22 53 
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Source: Unpublished paper by the MOE 
With every indication that the population, the number of vehicles, and energy 
consumption levels in the metropolitan area will continue to rise continuously, existing 
CAC measures based on technological and emission-rate standards seem insufficient to 
deal with the growing number of pollution sources. To overcome such challenges, the 
MOE developed the Special Measures for Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Improvement 
with the launch of a Joint Task Force Team consisting of government officials and expert 
representatives from industries, universities, professional institutions and civic groups. 
This team participated in more than 100 consultations until the Special Measures were 
finally established in 2002.  
            In December 2003, the Special Act for Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality 
Improvement was promulgated in an effort to develop an institutional framework for the 
effective implementation of the Special Measures: a total air pollution load (TAPL) 
management scheme, an emissions trading system, and mandatory increases in the supply 
of low emission vehicles. The Special Act went into effect starting in January 2005. 
Grace periods were granted to a number of industrial plants that required additional 
preparation work before the adoption of the TAPL management system. 
The Cap-and-Trade Program in Seoul, Korea  
  A. General 
The purpose of the Special Act for Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Improvement 
is stipulated in the first article of the law: “to develop an institutional framework for the 
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effective implementation of the Special Measures for air quality improvement in 
Seoul and its vicinities.”  More specifically, the act aims to improve air quality in the 
Seoul Metropolitan Area so to reach a similar level to those of major OECD countries 
within 10 years of the implementation of the Special Measures.  
A number of air pollutants, such as nitrogen oxides, have regional or global 
impact beyond their local consequences. Therefore, controlling ambient air quality based 
on a local management system within one jurisdiction has some limitations. That is why 
the MOE introduced wide-ranging and comprehensive special measures to bind the 
whole metropolitan area into an integrated system for air quality control.  
The MOE developed a 10-year framework plan for metropolitan air quality 
control and three local governments (Seoul, Incheon and Gyunggi) established 5-year 
Implementation Plans concerning stationary and mobile source emissions reduction 
programs given their social and environmental features. 
  B. Major Features of the Cap-and-Trade Program 
1. Applicability 
 With respect to geographic region, the cap-and-trade program in the Special Act 
is applied in most of the Seoul Metropolitan Area, which includes Seoul City, Incheon 
City, and most of Gyunggi Province (including 24 out of 31 cities)  
Facilities subject to the cap-and-trade program include power generating plants 
and industrial facilities emitting more than a certain amount of regulated pollutants such 
as nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx) and particulate matter (PM).  The cap-and- 
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trade program will be implemented into two phases: phase I will start in July 2007 
and will involve only larger facilities emitting more than 30 ton per year of NOx, 20 ton 
per year of SOx, or 1.5 ton per year of PM. Phase II, starting in July 2009, will include all 
facilities emitting more than 4 tons per year of NOx and SOx, or 0.2 tons per year of PM. 
Regulated facilities during phase II would number 309, which accounts for 2 percent in 
terms of the number of facilities, yet covers 84 percent of NOx, 78 percent of SOx, and 
57 percent of PM emissions from stationary sources.  
Figure 5. Seoul Metropolitan Area 
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 Unlike RECLAIM and the Acid Rain Programs in the US, there is no opt-in 
program whereby non-regulated facilities can participate voluntarily in the cap and trade.    
Table 5. Facilities Subjected to the Cap-and-Trade Program in Seoul 
Category NOx (ton/year) 
Sox 
(ton/year) 
PM 
(ton/year) 
Coverage 
(facilities) 
Phase I 
(July 2007) More than 30 More than 20  More than 1.5  137  
Phase II 
(July 2009) More than 4  More than 4  More than 0.2  309  
  Source: Unpublished paper by the MOE 
2. Setting the Cap: Total Air Pollution Load (TAPL) 
 Until recently, Korea's traditional air pollution regulations, like the emission 
standards system, monitored the pollution levels by each emitter (e.g. smoke stacks). 
Although this system was effective in controlling the pollution level of each emitter, it 
was not successful in reducing the total amount of pollution conditional on absorptive 
capacity because it lacked control over the increasing number of emitters. For this reason, 
the MOE introduced the TAPL management system to allocate a total volume of 
allowable emissions for each industrial site.  
 In the broader sense, the TAPL management system includes a cap-and-trade 
program. As Figure 6 indicates, the process of establishing a cap-and-trade involves three 
stages: (1) fixing the target for air quality in the area, (2) calculating the environmental 
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absorptive capacity, and (3) setting the cap in the region-- equal to the regional 
atmospheric environmental critical load. 
Figure 6. Process of the Total Air Pollution Load (TAPL) Management System 
Fixing the Target 
Air Quality Model 
Calculating Carrying Capacity
Setting the Cap 
Allocating the Regional Cap to Sources
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Cap and Trade among 
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Stationary Sources 
Compliance and Enforcement 
3. Allocation Distribution 
 Once the cap is set, the next step is to allocate the annual permits or allowances.  
As for the initial allocation, grandfathering based on historical emissions is applied rather 
than auctions (due to the constraints imposed by political feasibility).  
The starting allowances will be determined by the following formula:  
 Starting allowances (A1) = Σ (EF×L)  
 EF = the applicable starting emission factor for the subject source  
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 L = the activity level for each source emitting NOx, SOx or particulate 
matter 
              in the facility for the maximum throughput over the most recent 5 years. 
 The emissions factor (EF) for a certain unit is calculated by dividing the sum of 
annual average emissions across units by the sum of amount of fuel or material used by 
all units. Therefore, the same sorts of sources may well have the same emissions factor: 
EF = Σ annual average emissions / Σ annual total fuel used. Activity level (A) is the peak 
throughput such as the amount of fuel or material used in the process over the most recent 
five years. Even the same types of sources have different activity levels respectively.   
 After the starting allocations (A1) are determined based on the above formula, the 
allowances in fifth year (A5) would be determined in the similar way. In this case, the 
emissions factor will be modified in consideration of the Best Available Control 
Technology (BACT):  
Allowances in fifth year (A5) = Σ (EFm×L)  
EFm = modified emissions factor  
      L = the activity level for each source emitting NOx, SOx or particulate matter in      
             the facility for the maximum throughput over the most recent 5 years. 
After the two allowances allocations (A1, A5) are determined, the other allocations 
(A2, A3, A4) would be set automatically based on a linear interpolation method.    
To explain the initial allocation using a numeric example, suppose that there are 
three facilities in a region: A and B are paper mills, and C is a petrochemical plant. The 
table shows the activity level, average emissions and maximum emissions of equipment 
in three facilities.  
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Given the equation of emission factor (EF = Σ annual average emissions / Σ 
annual total fuel used), emission factors of boiler T type and incinerator R type are as 
follows: 
EFboiler T = (1+2+3.8) ÷ (10+15+30) = 0.1236 
EFincinerator R = (0.5+0.75) ÷ (100+150) = 0.005 
Table 6. Activity Level and Emissions of Facility A, B and C  
Category Business Equipment 
Activity 
Level 
(ton) 
Annual average 
emissions  
in the most  
Recent 5 years 
(ton/year) 
Annual maximum 
emissions  
in the most  
Recent 5 years 
(ton/year) 
Boiler T 
(LNG) 10 1 1.2 Facility  
A Paper mill 
Incinerator R 100 0.5 0.6 
Boiler T 
(LNG)  15 2 2.6 Facility  
B Paper mill 
Incinerator R 150 0.75 0.95 
Facility  
C Petrochemical 
Boiler T 
(LNG) 30 3.8 4.2 
 
 Therefore, the initial allocations (kg/year) of these three facilities are determined 
according to the following process: 
 Allocation to A= (10 tons×0.1236) + (100 tons×0.005) × 1000kg/ton = 1,736kg   
Allocation to B= (15 tons×0.1236) + (150 tons×0.005) × 1000kg/ton = 2,605kg 
Allocation to C= (30 tons×0.1236) × 1000kg/ton = 3,709kg 
According to these initial allocations, while facility A gets initial allocations 
(1,736kg) more than its average emissions (1,500 kg), facility B and C get initial 
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allocations (B: 2,605 kg, C:3,709 kg) less than their average emissions (B: 2,750 kg, 
C: 3,800 kg) respectively. 
 
4. Allowance Use 
 Generally, allowances can be used for compliance with the cap, trading with other 
sources, or banking for future use. Those who want to trade allowances turn in an 
application form to the Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Management District Office 
(SMAQMDO) seven days prior to the trade.  
There may be two kinds of restrictions imposed on allowance use in a cap-and- 
trade program: geographical and inter-temporal restrictions. In the case of NOx, SOx, and 
PM trading in Seoul, trading volumes available for each source are limited to a certain 
proportion of its allocated allowances: that is, the tradable allowances are restricted to 20 
percent in the starting year, 30 percent in the second and third years, and then 50 percent 
in the fourth and fifth years. Since allowance allocations are revised every five year, the 
above restrictions would be applied to the following allocations.    
 In the case of a plant shutdown, tradable allowances will be reduced to the 
allocated allowances multiplied by the operational days as a proportion of 365 days, and 
starting the next year of shutdown, allowances will be zero.  
In addition, even if there are no geographical restrictions explicitly, when a 
trading may lead to violation of ambient air quality standards or creation of hotspot, 
selling a permit to a plant in a possible non-attainment area is not allowed. 
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As for inter-temporal restrictions, banking is allowed but borrowing is not 
allowed. Unlike the ARP and RECLAIM, however, there are offsets from trading: if the 
amount of banked allowances is less than 10 percent of allowances in the subsequent 
year, 50 percent of allowances banked are counted in total available allowances. 
Meantime, if the amount of banked allowances exceeds 10 percent of allowances in the 
subsequent year, available allowances would be determined by the following formula: the 
amount of banked allowances×50 percent×0.1× (total allowances of all sources in the 
subsequent year/unused allowances of all sources in the year)                      
5. Monitoring and Enforcement 
 The success of an emissions trading program relies on the rate of compliance, and 
the compliance rate depends on accurate and reliable monitoring and enforcement. As for 
monitoring, regulated facilities have to establish a monitoring system and report their 
measured emissions to the SMAQMDO by the end of each month. Larger facilities 
subjected to the cap-and-trade in phase I, have already instituted the TMS which 
measures major pollutants including SOx, NOx, and particulate matter every five minute. 
Thus, they do not need to set up any additional monitoring system.         
Figure 7. Monitoring and Reporting Process 
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Missing data can occur due to technical problems such as sudden breakdown of 
monitoring equipment, but since there are no provisions dealing with problems caused by 
missing data, related rules will be added prior to the program’s implementation.    
 There are two enforcement mechanisms for non- compliance. Any facility that is 
out of compliance with its cap is subject to a financial penalty according to the following 
formula:        
 Penalties = per unit fee × emissions in excess of the cap × adjustment factors 
(excess rate factor× violation number factor× region factor) × price index 
    Table 7. Penalties for Non-Compliance under CATS  
Excess Rate factor1)
Violation  
Number 
Factor2)
Regional 
Factor3)
Pollutant 
Per 
ton 
Fee 
(USD) Below 
2% 
2-
4% 
4-
8%
8-
10%
10-
20% 
20-
30% 
30-
40% 
Over
40% 1 2 3 4+ I II III
Nox 2.9 1.2 1.45 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.5 5.0 7.0 
Sox 4.2 1.2 1.45 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.5 5.0 7.0 
PM 6.5 1.2 1.45 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.5 5.0 7.0 
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.0 1.5
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Reference: 
1) “Excess rate factor” shall be determined according to the following methodology: 
    Excess rate factor= (actual emissions- allowances)÷allowances×100  
2) “Violation number factor” indicates the number of violations over the most recent 5 years.  
3) “Regional factor” differs across region I, II and III 
 Region I: residential and commercial region 
             Region II: industrial region 
             Region III: forest, agricultural and conservational region  
 In addition to the financial penalty, the amount by which the current allowance is 
exceeded shall be subtracted from the subsequent allowance allocation: the total 
subtracted allowances shall be the exceedence of allowances multiplied by the violation 
number factor above. 
  C. Other Control Measures to Supplement Cap and Trade 
 Generally speaking, concerning integration with other regulations, two things 
should be taken into consideration: (1) the program should complement regulations on 
mobile and area sources which are not covered by the cap-and-trade program, and (2) the 
program should be compatible with other pre-existing regulations.  The cap-and-trade 
program in Seoul only covers stationary sources emitting NOx, SOx, PM which account 
for about 30 percent of emissions in the region. Thus, other regulations on mobile and 
area sources will be introduced as well.  
1. Enhanced supply of Low Emission Vehicles 
 Emissions from vehicles account for roughly 51 percent of NOx, 58 percent of 
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PM, and 85 percent of CO emissions in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. This means 
that enhancing the supply of low-emission vehicles (LEV) and zero-emission vehicles 
(ZEV) will be one of the most important elements when it comes to improving ambient 
air quality. The Special Law for Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Improvement categorizes 
LEV/ZEVs into type 1, 2, 3 according to the level of pollution reduction they allow: type 
1 are zero emissions vehicles such as electric and fuel cell vehicles; type 2 are CNG, LPG 
or gas-electronic hybrid vehicles which meet the strict emissions criteria and whose NOx 
emissions are lower by 25 to 50 percent compared to conventional vehicles; and type 3 
are gasoline or diesel vehicles meeting  the same criteria as type 2 vehicles.   
 Starting in 2005, nearly all government entities in the Seoul Metropolitan Area 
will be required to make a certain portion of newly purchased vehicles be LEV/ZEVs. On 
the manufacturing side, automakers selling more than 3,000 vehicles per year in the area 
are advised to supply LEV/ZEVs at a rate negotiated with the MOE. 
2. Controlling Vehicles in Operation 
 Older vehicles that were manufactured according to past emission standards emit 
a greater amount of air pollution than newer vehicles. Therefore, taking active measures 
to reduce emissions from vehicles that are already in operation is critical to the task of 
achieving drastic improvements in air quality. First, recognizing that diesel vehicle 
exhaust emissions account for almost 100% of PM and 75% of NOx discharged by 
vehicles, the MOE strengthened emission standards for all diesel vehicles currently in 
operation. Also, those which fail emissions tests will be required to install Diesel 
Particulate Filters (DPF) or Diesel Oxidation Catalysts (DOC), or to retrofit the vehicle 
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with "cleaner" engines. Governmental subsidies (roughly 50% of installation or 
retrofit costs) will be provided to encourage these activities.  
3. Fuel Quality Improvement 
 Starting in October 2004, only low-sulfur fuels have been supplied in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area. New standards for sulfur content were strengthened from 430 ppm to 
less than 30 ppm. Furthermore, by introducing a grade scheme for fuel qualities, the 
MOE is providing information in the hope of helping consumers make environmentally 
sound choices.  
4. New VOC Reductions 
 VOC, which are highly challenging to control, are organic compounds in their 
liquid or vapor state. In addition to posing threats to human health, VOC combined with 
NOx in the ambient air generate ozone due to their high level of photochemical 
reactivity. In order to reduce VOC at their sources, the MOE mandates that paint 
manufacturers must decrease the organic solvent content in paints by 30%, and 
encourages the development and use of water-based paints. 
 In addition to the introduction of new complimentary regulations, it is important 
for a cap-and-trade program not to duplicate or conflict with pre-existing technical and 
emissions rate-based regulations. For example, sources subject to the cap-and-trade 
program will be exempt from general emissions charges imposed on SOx and PM.  Also, 
sources emitting SOx which participate in the cap-and-trade program are exempt from the 
requirement for reduced sulfur content in fuels. 
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 Even if it’s not sure a voluntary agreement works, any regulated sources, 
which want to make their environmental efforts public can make an agreement with the 
regulatory authority that they comply with intensified emissions cap rather than required 
in the law.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Experiences with Emissions Trading in the US 
Introduction 
Since the mid-1970s, the US has been a leader in the development of emissions 
trading programs. In the earlier forms such as the EPA’s Emissions Reduction Credits 
(ERC) trading programs, emissions trading programs were added to an existing regulatory 
system. Baseline emissions were determined based on the existing technology of the plant 
and ERC were earned by reducing emissions below this level. However, this approach was 
not sufficient to meet environmental goals with certainty.     
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In the mid-1990s, more-successful variants of permit trading emerged, 
including the ARP and RECLAIM. Cap-and-trade programs, not based on technology 
standards, could greatly enhance certainty about total emissions while minimizing 
compliance costs.             
Initially, tradable permit programs were implemented mostly in the US mainly in 
air pollution control. Nowadays, however, trading programs have gained popularity 
across the world, and their use is spreading to a variety of environmental management 
problems, including fisheries, climate change, renewable energy transport, transportation, 
solid waste management, and water resources management (OECD, 2002). In this study, 
five emissions trading programs which have implemented in the US are explored and 
then three major cap-and-trade programs-- the SO2 Trading in the ARP, RECLAIM, and 
NBT-- are compared one other in terms of eight categories: purpose and framework, 
coverage,  allocations, trading rules, trading market, relationship with other regulations, 
monitoring and reporting, and enforcement          
Overview of the U.S. emissions trading programs 
 A. EPA Emissions Trading Programs 
The EPA developed four types of emissions trading programs in an effort to reduce 
abatement costs by providing more flexibility for stationary sources.  Under the Clean Air 
Act (CAA) of 1970, technical regulations imposed a considerable burden on emitting 
plants. Especially in non-attainment areas, new sources were not allowed, which meant that 
the original CAA imposed serious restrictions on economic growth and regional economic 
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activities. Against a backdrop of the increasing debate about traditional technology-
based regulations, the earliest ERC trading programs emerged. The program has been 
implemented by means of four policies, each of which concerns the trading of ERCs.    
 Offsets: Offsets, introduced in 1976, apply to new sources in non-attainment areas 
for the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS). Emissions from existing 
sources should be reduced by at least as much as the new source would contribute. 
Typically, new or expanding sources must purchase 20% more emissions in terms of 
offsets than would be added when the new source commences operation; 
 Netting: Netting, first implemented in 1974, is applied to existing sources which 
modify or expand their equipment. These sources could be exempt from otherwise 
applicable new source review procedures as long as existing emissions elsewhere in the 
same facility are reduced by a sufficient amount;  
Bubbles: While the netting and offset policies allow sources more flexibility to 
meet the NAAQS, those programs apply to new or expanded facilities. Existing facilities 
were not given similar flexibility until the EPA announced its bubble policy in 1979. The 
bubble policy was developed to allow a group of sources to combine the limits for several 
different sources into one combined limit and to determine compliance based on that 
aggregate limit instead of emissions from each individual source. These bubbles can be 
extended to cover point sources of emissions in plants owned by other firms as well; and   
Banking: Banking was later added to allow firms to store their own ERCs for 
future use (Ellerman et al., 2003; Tietenberg, 2003). 
 In 1986, the EPA formally promulgated the netting, offset, bubble, and banking 
programs in its Emissions Trading Policy Statement. Even though the EPA’s ERC 
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trading programs were the first application of emissions trading programs as actual 
policy, their performance was disappointing. This was mainly due to a requirement for 
case-by-case certification or prior approval of trading, which made the transaction costs 
associated with trades simply to high. 
 B. Lead-in-Gasoline Trade Program 
 In effect only from 1982 to 1987, the EPA’s Lead-in-Gasoline Trade Program can 
be described as the first real success among emissions trading programs.  This averaging 
program is widely regarded as having been a much more successful trading program than 
the EPA’s earlier ERC trading program.  
The EPA’s phasing-out of the lead content of gasoline can be partitioned into 
three stages. Starting in 1973, lead limits for gasoline were implemented based on 
refinery-specific regulations in which each refinery had to meet an average lead 
concentration across all of its total gasoline production. In 1982, trading was available 
across refineries nationwide, which means that any refinery reducing the lead content of 
their gasoline below their specified limits was able to sell their credits to other refineries 
that had not reduced their limits. In 1985, the EPA promulgated their lead phase-out 
program, involving a more-strict lead limit (in two phases) and allowing banking by 
regulated refineries. In July 1985, each refinery had to reduce lead content from 1.1 
grams per gallon to 0.5 grams per gallon, and then in January 1986, to 0.1 grams per 
gallon. In terms of traded volume, the lead phase-out market was very active, especially 
after banking was introduced. During 1983 to 1987, the number of lead permits traded 
steadily increased, from about 10 percent to more than 50 percent of all lead permits.     
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 Even though there have been no studies concerning cost savings from the 
Lead-in-Gasoline trading program, it can be predicted that there were a considerable cost 
savings, evidenced by the great number of trades. I believe this program is viewed as a 
success because of these two factors. First, the Lead-in-Gasoline trading program was an 
averaging program. Unlike the earlier ERC, averaging can negate any need for case-by-
case pre-approval of tradable credits. Those regulated refineries that reduced their lead 
content below the average limit were automatically certified to be issued credits. Another 
factor was banking. The use of banking seemed to facilitate a faster reduction in lead 
content. In fact, without the lead trading program, it would probably not have been 
feasible to achieve such an aggressive target via conventional CAC methods.    
 C. SO2 Trading Program in the Acid Rain Program 
 The SO2 Trading Program was introduced under Title IV of the 1990 CAAA to 
reduce precursor emissions that lead to acid deposition. In addition to the major purpose 
of reducing the effects of acid deposition, there were two secondary motives as well. The 
first motive was to reduce fine particulates, another pollutant known to threaten public 
health (SO2 emissions were understood to contribute to fine particulate pollution).  The 
second motive was to reduce the difference between emissions limits imposed on existing 
sources (ahead of the 1970 CAA amendment) by State Implementation Plans (SIP) and 
stricter emissions limits imposed on new sources in non-attainment areas (after the 1970 
CAA amendment) by the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). As all states in the 
U.S. could meet the SO2 standard by the 1980s due to several SO2 reduction regulations, 
additional regulations beyond just the NSPS would be needed. In sum, the SO2 cap-and-
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trade program was introduced for several reasons: to reduce acid deposition 
nationwide, but mainly in the Northeast; to lessen fine particulates; and to reduce the 
difference between emissions limits imposed on new sources and those on existing 
sources (Ellerman, 2004).          
 The program has been phased in, with the final Phase II SO2 cap (9 million tons) 
set at about one half of 1980 emissions (17.3 million tons) from electric power generation 
units. During Phase I, which lasted from 1995 through 1999, larger fossil fuel burning 
units with more than 100 MW of generating capacity were subject to the program.  In 
Phase II, beginning in 2000, the program was expanded to include almost all fossil fuel 
electricity generating facilities greater than 25MW.         
 In evaluating a trading program, two major criteria should typically be taken into 
consideration: cost effectiveness (“cost savings), and environmental effectiveness 
(“meeting the cap”). With respect to environmental effectiveness, throughout all periods, 
each source’s actual emissions did not exceed the sum of its allocated allowances in that 
year and unused allowances from the previous years, resulting in nearly 100 percent 
compliance. 
Figure 8. SO2 Emissions under the Acid Rain Program 
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 Source:  EPA (2005) 
 In terms of cost effectiveness, substantial cost savings are implied by two factors: 
an available single market price, and a significant number of allowances traded. Even 
though prices have varied over time from $65 in 1996 to $860 in 2006, a single price 
prevailed. Since 1995, except for recent price spike since 2004 due to EPA’s Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (CAIR) which aims to reduce power industry ozone season NOx 
emissions by about 50% from 2003, price changes was relatively stable. 
Figure 9. SO2 Allowance Prices under the Acid Rain Program 
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 As a proportion of the overall cap, traded allowances have been substantial 
during the entire program. In 2004, when 9 million tons of allowances were allocated, 
roughly 15.3 million were traded, of which 7.5 million were transferred in economically 
significant amounts between economically unrelated parties.     
Figure 10. SO2 Allowances Traded under the Acid Rain Program 
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active trading, the cost-savings under the SO2 trading in the ARP are estimated to 
antial. As Table 8 shows, cost savings for the thirteen years are evaluated 20 
ollars, which indicates a cost savings of about 55% relative to the assumed CAC 
ons. 
Table 8. Abatement Cost and Cost Savings under the Acid Rain Program 
(Millions of present-value 1995 dollars) 
Cost Savings from Emissions Trading 
y 
Abatement 
Cost with 
Trading 
Abatement 
Cost w/o 
Trading 
Phase I 
Spatial 
Trading 
Banking
Phase II 
Spatial 
Trading 
Total 
Cost 
Savings 
Savings as a 
Percentage 
of Cost w/o 
Trading 
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Average 
Phase I 
(1995-99) 
735 1,093 358 - - 358 33% 
Average 
Phase II 
(2000-07) 
1,400 3,682 - 167 2,115 2,282 62% 
13-Year 
Sum 14,875 34,925 1,792 1,339 16,919 20,050 57% 
 Source: Adapted from Ellerman et al. (2000)  
  D. Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (RECLAIM) 
 Following the enactment of the 1990 CAAA, along with the SO2 market under the 
Acid Rain Program, another cap and trade program developed in the Los Angeles 
Region. RECLAIM, adopted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
(SCAQMD) in October 1993, after a three year of debate, set an emissions cap and 
declining balance for electrical power plants and industrial boilers emitting over 4 tons of 
NOx or SOx per year. The initial purpose of RECLAIM was a 70% reduction in NOx 
emissions and a 60% reduction in SOx emissions by 2003 so as to bring the Los Angeles 
Basin into compliance using the most cost-efficient means.  
 As of the early 1990s, air emissions were subject to the control measures in the 
1989 Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP) which was designed to bring the Los 
Angeles Basin into compliance with federal air quality standards by 2010. However, the 
compliance costs that the AQMP imposed on businesses were enormous-- up to 13 
billion dollars per year so that there was an urgent need for more efficient tools, if air 
quality regulations were not to push businesses to leave the region.  
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 RECLAIM, developed by a local jurisdiction, has several different features 
from other emissions trading programs such as the Acid Rain Program. First, it covers 
heterogeneous pollutants and numerous sectors rather than a homogeneous pollutant 
focused on a single sector. Second, it has spatial and temporal constrictions on flexibility: 
the region subjected to the RECLAIM is divided into two geographical zones-- an inland 
and a coastal zone. Trading from the former zone to the latter is allowed, but the converse 
is not. In other words, no firm can sell its permits upwind; RECLAIM has no banking 
system, but provides a limited temporal flexibility by grouping sources into two 
overlapping 12-month compliance periods.     
 With regard to achieving environmental targets, RECLAIM has been successful. 
In every compliance year except 2000, actual emissions in the aggregate have not 
exceeded emissions caps, even if compliance rates for individual sources have ranged 
only between 85% and 95%. Exceptionally in 2000, NOx emissions exceeded the 
RECLAIM cap by about 6% due to the price spike in NOx RECLAIM Trading Credits 
(RTC) caused by the California electricity crisis. However, the non-compliance in 2000 
was due in large part to flaws in California’s deregulation process in electricity markets 
rather than to defects in the RECLAIM program in itself. The excess emissions in 2000 
were offset by deduction from the subsequent emissions cap. Moreover, there is no 
guarantee that the traditional CAC regulations could have dealt with the 2000 crisis better 
(Harrison, 2004).  
Figure 11. NOx Emissions under RECLAIM 
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Figure 12. SOx Emissions under RECLAIM 
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g volumes have been enormous. In almost every year, the volumes traded in each 
ve exceeded that year’s cap, which implies that many of these trades are in future 
s and there is double counting of trades transacted through brokers.  
Figure 13 and 14 show the number of NOx RTCs and SOx RTCs traded 
tively. These trades include both RTCs traded with price and RTCs traded without 
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price ($0 price). Trades without price generally occur when: a seller transfer  RTCs 
to a broker, there is a transfer between facilities under common ownership etc.       
Figure 13. Total Quantity of NOx RTCs Traded under RECLAIM 
 
Source:  SCAQMD (2005) 
Figure 14. Total Quantity of SOx RTCs Traded under RCLAIM 
 
Source:  SCAQMD (2005) 
 Between 1995 and 1999, prices for NOx RTCs were fairly stable, ranging from 
$1,500 to about $4,000. In 2000, however, NOx RTC prices shot up to about $40,000 and 
then to $60,000 in early 2001 due to the 2000 California energy crisis. After the major 
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revisions to RECLAIM in May 2001, including temporary suspended participation 
in RECLAIM by electricity generators and instead paying mitigation fee of $15,000 per 
ton, Prices for NOx RTC have been stabilized at under $10,000. Meanwhile, prices for 
SOx RTC have been lower and more stable than prices for NOx RTC.     
Figure 15. Yearly Average Prices for NOx RTCs under RECLAIM 
 
Figure 16. Yearly Average Prices for SOx RTCs under RECLAIM 
 
 
  Source:  SCAQMD (2005)Source:  SCAQMD (2005)E. NOx Budget Trading Program 
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 Since the enactment of the 1990 CAA Amendments, the EPA has developed 
several programs to limit ground-level ozone (“smog”) formation by reducing its key 
precursor NOx. These programs include the Acid Rain NOx Reduction Program, Ozone 
Transport Commission (OTC) NOx Budget Program, NOx State Implementation Plan 
(SIP) Call, and NOx Budget Trading Program (NBP).    
 The Acid Rain NOx Reduction Program started in 1996, and contributed to 
reduction of NOx emissions from coal fired electric generating units (by means of 
averaging) to meet standards for NOx emission rates. However, because it does not 
involve a cap on total NOx emissions and trades among sources, overall NOx emissions 
may increase over time as demand for electricity keeps growing.  
 The other three NOx reduction programs can be categorized as cap-and-trade 
programs: the OTC NOx Budget Program ran from 1999 to 2002, when it was supplanted 
by the NOx SIP Call. The NBT was designed to help states meet their NOx SIP Call 
required reductions. 
1. The OTC NOx Budget Program 
 The OTC NOx Budget Program was the first major case of a multi-jurisdictional 
trading program developed by several states. The OTC was established under the 1990 
CAAA to help twelve states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions meet air quality 
standards for ground-level ozone from May 1st through September 30th.  
Following the development of a Model Rule negotiated by the OTC states and the 
EPA, nine states and the District of Columbia adopted this multi-state cap-and- trade 
program to reduce NOx emissions and address the transport of ozone. The OTC NOx 
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Budget Trading was operated until May of 2003 when it was replaced by the EPA’s 
NOx SIP Call and the NOx Budget Trading Program.  
 To meet the OTC budget, fossil-fuel- fired power-generating facilities and 
industrial boilers were required to eliminate roughly 75% of NOx emissions by 2003, 
relative to 1990 baseline levels.  The OTC Budget Program was very successful in 
meeting the overall emissions target. As Figure 17 shows, the OTC Budget Program 
helped reduce NOx emissions significantly. In the 2002 ozone season, for example, total 
emissions were about 60% below 1990 levels. 
Figure 17. Emissions from the NOx Budget Program 
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      Source: EPA (2003) 
 In addition, these emissions reductions were made cost-effectively. There are 
again two pieces of evidence indicating the presence of a maturing market resulting in 
cost savings. First, the volume of economically significant trades (trades between 
separate economic entities) was substantial (about 50% of the cap) and generally 
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increased over time. Second, OTC allowance prices were generally stable at less 
than $1,000, throughout the implementation period (except for the temporary price spike, 
up to $ 7,000 in vintage 1999, which was due to fears of an allowance shortage).  
Figure 18. Volumes and Prices of OTC NOx Allowances 
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      Source: EPA (2003) 
2. The NOx Budget Trading Program (NBP) under NOx SIP Call 
Despite the efforts of the OTC during 1998 to 2002, ambient smog conditions 
remained a serious threat to public health and the affected areas showed no signs of 
achieving the ozone standard, so further NOx reduction efforts became necessary.  
In 1995, the EPA and the Environmental Council of the States formed the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group (OTAG) to begin addressing the problem of ozone transport 
in the eastern states. In 1998, based on the OTAG’s assessment, the EPA issued a new 
rule called the NOx SIP Call to achieve reduction in NOx emissions during the ozone- 
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season across a region that includes most of the OTC states and some southeastern 
and Midwestern that contribute to another state’s inability to achieve the ozone standard. 
Affected states under the NOx SIP Call had to submit revised SIP. 
The NOx SIP Call requires states to meet an overall emissions budget, rather than 
to require each source to reduce NOx emissions. To give affected states flexibility to 
choose emissions control options, EPA developed a NOx Budget Trading Program. All 
affected states chose to comply with the NOx SIP Call by participating in the NOx 
Budget Trading Program (NBP): the OTC states compliance period started on May 1, 
2003, but the other states’ compliance was delayed until May 31, 2004. 
In response to the NOx SIP Call, aggregate NOx emissions from the power 
industry dropped significantly after 2002. From 2002 to 2004, the ozone-season NOx 
emissions reduction in the power industry was an average of 19 percent annually (from 
1,222,000 tons/year in 2000 to 819,000 tons/year in 2003 to 593,000 tons/year in 2004), 
which is dramatic reductions compared to those from other sources: for example, on-road 
mobile had reduced only 5 percent annually over the same periods.  
As Figure 19 indicates, there were over 230,000 allowances (about 40% of total 
transfers) involved in economically significant trades in 2004, slightly lower than in 2003. 
However, overall trading activity remained robust. Also, allowance prices, showed in 
Figure 20, stabilized in 2004 and are down considerably from early 2003, which is an 
indication that the cap-and-trade market has matured.  
Figure 19. Economically Significant Trades under the NOx Budget Program 
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ure 20. NOx Allowance Prices by Month of Sale under the NOx Budget Program 
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Meanwhile, the EPA has issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) 
2005, intended to further reduce ground-level ozone. NBP will be replace2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007  
as of March 
d the 
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CAIR’s trading program from 2009. CAIR reduces NOx more significantly through 
two different emissions budgets: one for ozone season NOx in 25 states and D.C., and 
another for annual NOx and SO2 in 23 states and D.C. After the implementation of the 
CAIR, EPA predicts that in 2015, only six ozone non-attainment areas will remain in the 
eastern states: New York, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, 
D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Comparative Features of Major Trading Programs in the U.S. 
Category EPA Emissions Lead-in- SO2 Trading RECLAIM NOx Budget
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Trading 
Programs 
Gasoline 
Trading  
in ARP Trading Program
1. Type Emission 
Reduction 
Credit (ERC) 
Averaging Cap-and-Trade Cap-and-Trade Cap-and-Trade 
2. Legal  
   Framework 
EPA’s 
regulations 
EPA’s 
regulations 
1990 CAAA 1990 CAAA and 
California CAA 
1990 CAAA 
3. Regulator EPA EPA EPA South Coast Air 
Quality 
Management 
District 
EPA, 
12 states, and 
D.C.  
4. Purpose Providing 
flexibility to 
reduce control 
costs 
Phase-out of 
lead-in- 
gasoline 
 
50% reduction 
in acidification 
Attainment of ozone 
standard: 70% 
reduction in ozone 
forming substances 
Attainment of 
ozone standard 
(ozone season) 
5. Spatial  
    Scope 
National  
 
 
National 
 
 
National Local: 
Los Angeles Basin 
Regional: 
Northeastern  
States 
6. Years 1970s~Present 1982~1987 
1995~Present 
(Phase I: 1995-
1999, Phase 
II:2000-) 
1994~Present 
1998~Present 
(including OTC 
Program 1998-
2002) 
7. Pollutants Various Lead-in -Gasoline SO2 NOx, SOx NOx 
8. Sources Electricity 
power plants & 
industrial 
boilers and 
turbines 
Refineries 
 
 
Electricity 
power plants 
Electricity power 
plants &  
industrial boilers 
and turbines 
Electricity power 
plants & 
industrial boilers 
and turbines 
9. Market 
Relatively few 
trades 
 
Vigorous 
market; 
over half of 
refineries 
participate 
Well-
functioning 
market 
Well-functioning 
market 
Well-functioning 
market 
10. Evaluation Disappointing: 
higher 
transaction costs 
due to pre-
approval 
 
Successful: 
Averaging 
program and 
banking 
Very successful: 
minimal 
restrictions on 
trades 
Successful, but price 
volatility due to lack 
of banking  
Successful 
 
Source: Modified version from Ellerman et al. (2003) 
Case Studies of Three Major Programs 
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The SO2 Trading in the ARP, RECLAIM, and the NOx Budget Trading 
Program in the U.S. are widely considered as successful cap-and-trade programs. In order 
to draw useful lessons that can be applied for other emissions trading programs, it is 
necessary to find both similarities and differences affecting the performance of these 
programs.  In this section, three major cap-and-trade programs are compared closely in 
terms of the following factors: purpose and framework, coverage, allocations, trading rules, 
trading market, relationship with other regulations, monitoring, and enforcement.  
To make this assessment, government annual audit or progress reports, as well as 
some previous comparative research, are mainly employed (Schwarze and Zappel, 1999; 
Kosobud, 2000; EPA, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; SCAQMD 2005).   
 A. Purpose and Framework 
In light of the goals of the different programs, SO2 trading in the ARP is 
distinguished from RECLAIM and the NOx Budget Trading Program. The SO2 trading in 
the ARP aims to reduce environmental damage due to acid deposition from SOx transports 
across the country, RECLAIM and the NOx Budget Trading Program focus on regional 
ground-level ozone caused by industrial activities, that results in exceedances of the 
NAAQS.  With respect to the presence of pre-existing regulations, while the SO2 trading in 
ARP is an introduction of new regulations in an unregulated problem arena, RECLAIM 
and the OTC NOx Budget Program (the predecessor of the NBP) replaced control plans 
established in the 1989 Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP) in California and emissions 
limits based on Reasonable Available Control Technology (RACT) respectively. 
Therefore, in the process of establishing trading programs, the SO2 Trading Program in the 
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ARP involves more complex political debates and more uncertainty about 
environmental implications than RECLAIM or the NBP.  
The SO2 Trading Program in the ARP, RECLAIM, and the NBP have several 
features in common. First, as cap-and-trade programs, these trading programs aim to 
achieve simultaneously both environmental certainty and cost-effectiveness. In particular, 
trading schemes were introduced as a last resort to avoid excessive compliance costs 
imposed on facilities under traditional command and control measures.  
Second, trading programs reflect environmental concerns. These three emissions 
trading programs coexist with pre-existing regulations. For example, in the realm of these 
three trading programs, NAAQS for sulfur dioxide functions as a backstop provision to 
avoid possible hotspot problems and technology-based New Source Performance Standards 
(NSPS) have been applied as well. In addition, RECLAIM and the NBP have restrictions 
on the use of allowances geographically or temporally.     
Third, political and distributional considerations, as well as economic and 
environmental considerations, play an important role in the development process of the 
trading programs.  Even if auctions have advantages over the grandfathering method in 
terms of revenue recycling and long-term cost-effectiveness (due to the existence of 
transaction costs), initial allocations of permits in these three programs were based on 
grandfathering due to political feasibility. In particular, the exclusion of Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOCs) and mobile sources from RECLAIM can be explained as examples of 
reflecting political feasibility.   
Distributional conflict is another factor considered in the development of these 
three trading programs. Because permits are de facto rights, initial allocations of permits 
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may well be contentious among regulated facilities. In the case of SO2 trading in the 
ARP, the Mid-western states argued in favor of grandfathering while the Western states 
insisted on a permit market less constraining to economic growth. Among the Mid-western 
states, there were winners and losers depending on their representatives’ political influence 
-- some dirty states, such as Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, gained relatively larger special 
allowances and bonuses for installing scrubbers.  
 B. Market Coverage 
Market coverage is different in the three trading programs: geographical scope, 
covered pollutants, and affected sources. With respect to the geographical scope, while the 
SO2 Trading in the ARP is now nationwide (covering all states except for Alaska, Hawaii, 
and Idaho), the NBP and RECLAIM focus on localized ground-level ozone so that their 
geographical scopes are limited to the eastern states and the Los Angeles Air Basin (the 
jurisdiction of the SCAQMD) respectively. 
SO2 trading in the ARP and the NBP cover only one pollutant, sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides respectively, while RECLAIM regulates two pollutants, nitrogen oxides 
and sulfur oxides at once. In terms of market coverage of total emissions, SO2 trading in the 
ARP covers approximately 70 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions while RECLAIM covers 
only 33 percent of NOx emissions and 75 percent of SOx emissions, and the NBT covers 
only 23 percent of NOx emissions.  
The difference in coverage rates comes from the fact that sulfur dioxide, 
nationwide, stems mainly from a relatively small number of large stationary sources, such 
as power generating plants, while nitrogen oxides are generated from many more wide-
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spread sources, such as mobile sources. For example, NOx emissions in the eastern 
states come from three types of sources: mobile sources (approx. 55%), power industry 
sources, such as large electric generating units, some large industrial boilers and turbines 
(approx. 23%), and other sources mostly heating, including some industrial boilers and 
residential fuel combustion systems (approx. 22%).   
While SO2  trading in the ARP applies only to large fossil fuel-fired electric 
generating units greater than 25 MW, RECLAIM and the NBP cover relatively smaller 
stationary sources including an assortment of industrial boilers, as well as electric 
generating units. In terms of the implementation schedule, while SO2 trading in the ARP 
has been applied in two phases, RECLAIM and the NBP were not phased in, just fully 
applied to all affected sources simultaneously.  
In the case of SO2 trading in the ARP and RECLAIM, a facility can voluntarily 
participate in (“opt-in” to) the programs regardless of its emissions level. In principle, the 
opt-in provision helps reduce compliance costs across sources, but in practice, it shows few 
additional emissions reductions due to overly generous allocations (Ellerman, et al., 2000)  
 C. Allocations 
Major allocation issues can be classified into three groups: initial permit allocations, 
allocation periods, and baseline periods. 
First, initial permit allocations are the most contentious in a cap-and-trade program 
because permits (allowances or RTCs) are virtual property rights. All three programs adopt 
a grandfathering approach: free allocations based on historical emissions instead of using 
an auctioning approach. Even though the auctioning approach with the transaction costs has 
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advantages over the grandfathering approach in terms of long-term economic 
efficiency and revenue recycling, the latter approach prevails in the real world due to 
political acceptance. Unlike SO2 trading in the ARP and the NBP, RECLAIM allows RTCs 
generated outside regulated sources, such as the conversion of emission reduction credits 
(ERCs) and external offsets pursuant to the New Source Review regulations. 
Second, in terms of allocation periods, there can be three alternative options: 
permanent allocations, longer-period allocations, and shorter-period allocations. The longer 
updating periods are, the less it influences each source’s future behavior.  While the SO2 
allocations in the ARP are permanent, RECLAIM and the NBP adopt updated allocations; 
in RECLAIM, for example, allocations were scheduled to be updated in 1994, 2000, 2003, 
and 2007.  
Third and the last, with regard to the baseline periods, all three programs adopt 
emissions-based baselines. While SO2 trading in the ARP uses average emissions levels 
over three years (1985 to 1987), RECLAIM employs maximum emissions levels over four 
years (1989 to 1992). Compared to average emissions in the ARP, maximum emissions 
over longer years in RECLAIM seem to have led to over-allocations of permits, which 
reflect the political necessity of favoring current businesses.          
  
 
 D. Trading Rules 
 ７４
There may be two kinds of trading rules constraining transferability of 
permits: geographical constraints and temporal constraints. More constraints are likely to 
increase transaction costs, which results in a less-successful cap-and-trade program.  
With respect to geographical constraints, even if there were concerns about possible 
local concentration of emissions (“hotspots”) in the development of the program, SO2 
trading in the ARP adopted no geographical restrictions for three reasons: first, hotspots 
can be regulated by other overlapping regulatory standards such as NAAQS; second, the 
large reduction in SO2 emissions alleviates ambient air quality problems nationwide; third, 
the most cost-effective reductions can occur in the areas with the largest and highest 
emitting plants (EPA, 2004). On the other hand, RECLAIM uses two trading zones. 
Trading from the inland (downwind) zone to the coastal (upwind) zone is not allowed in 
RECLAIM for fear of creating hotspots. In the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) 
Budget Trading Program for reducing NOx emissions, the Ozone Transport Region (OTR) 
is divided into three zones (inner, outer, and northern zones) in accordance with levels of 
the ozone problem, but it allows unrestricted trading among three zones.  
There are two forms of temporal flexibility, such as banking and borrowing. All 
three programs are similar in that they don’t allow borrowing-- using future permits for 
compliance in current period. In terms of banking-- using current permits for compliance in 
future periods-- SO2 trading in the ARP has no restrictions on the use of banking. However, 
in RECLAIM, emissions sources are grouped into two overlapping compliance periods, 
one from January through December and the other from July through June. Sources in one 
compliance period can trade allowances with sources in the other compliance period, so 
that this six-month overlapping period system serves as a kind of limited banking. The 
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NOx Budget Trading Program allows banking of allowances for future use, but there 
are automatic limits imposed on the use of banked allowances when the total number of 
allowances banked for all sources exceeds 10 percent of the total regional budget for the 
next year. In this case, the flow control ratio, determined by dividing 10 percent of the 
budget by the number of banked allowances, is applied. For example, if source S holds 
2,000 banked allowances at the end of 2005, and the flow control ratio is 0.25, S will be 
able to use 500 of them on a 1 for 1 basis, but can use the remaining 1,500 on a 2 for 1 
basis (EPA, 2003a)    
 E. Trading Market  
With respect to market activation, while the SO2 Trading in the ARP has mandatory 
auctions administered by the EPA annually, RECLAIM and the NBP have non-mandatory 
auctions run by private parties. In the SO2 Trading Program, 2.8% of the total allocated 
allowances are set aside for the annual auction, whose proceeds are reimbursed to all 
sources according to their share of withheld allowances. On the other hand, auctions in 
RECLAIM and the NBP rely entirely on permits offered by private holders. 
In terms of auction type, while an SO2 Trading auction is discriminatory; in other 
words, the bidding price can be different case-by-case, auctions in RECLAIM and the NBP 
are non-discriminatory, which means all permits are traded at one clearing market price.          
Open participation for everyone is a common feature in those three programs. 
Active intermediaries (brokers) help the development of trading markets by reducing 
transaction costs. Meanwhile, public participation including environmental groups, meets 
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environmental target by purchasing and retiring permits, and enhances public 
environmental consciousness.    
 F. Relationship with other regulations 
No policy can be implemented in a vacuum. As Thompson (2000) argues, most 
emissions trading programs must be implemented to complement or replace pre-existing 
CAC regulations. It is extremely difficult to bring an emissions trading program into effect 
where there is no prior CAC regulation of sources and pollutants. Also, as can be seen in 
the cases in the UK and Poland, emissions trading schemes are unlikely to be successful 
when they are not compatible with pre-existing regulations.  
Several overlapping regulations exist in the three programs considered here. In the 
case of SO2 trading in the ARP, NAAQS has served as a backstop to protect against 
potential hotspots and the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) requirements based 
on the New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) have also been in place. There are 
similar overlapping regulations in RECLAIM and the NBP, such as national and state air 
quality standards for ozone and PM10, as well as the NSPS.  
With regard to incorporation of mobile or other area sources into these programs, 
there are no specific provisions as to mobile or area sources in SO2 trading in the ARP since 
electricity-generating plants account for about 70 percent of SO2 emissions nationwide. 
However, since RECLAIM and the NBP deal mainly with ground-level ozone by reducing 
NOx emissions, the necessity for regulations on mobile or area sources was widely 
recognized.   
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In RECLAIM, several project-based programs, including temporary credit 
programs, such as the Air Quality Investment Program in 2001, are in place to supplement 
the cap-and-trade program. Integration of different emissions trading like this may increase 
the cap through converting ERCs (generated from unregulated sources) into RTCs and as a 
result, undermine the degree of environmental certainty provided by the program.  For the 
NBP, combining control efforts with mobile source programs such as Low Emissions 
Vehicle (LEV) has been stressed.      
 G. Monitoring and Reporting 
Reliable monitoring and reporting are the keys to compliance and enforcement. 
Concerning monitoring, the SO2 Trading Program requires all affected sources to install 
continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS). The few exceptions include sources 
which are very small or operate very infrequently, or some large sources burning pipeline- 
quality natural gas.  
However, RECLAIM and the NBP do not mandate the CEMS for all affected 
sources. RECLAIM has three-tiered monitoring requirements: for major sources emitting 
more than 10 tons of NOx and SOx emissions, the most accurate and most reliable CEMS 
is required. Other large sources are allowed to establish fuel meters or continuous process 
monitoring systems (CPMS) which correlate multiple process parameters to mass 
emissions instead of directly monitoring NOx or SOx emissions. Small or process units are 
only required to install fuel meters. In the NOx Budget Trading Program, while coal-fired 
units are required to use the CEMS to measure NOx and stack gas flow rates, oil- and gas-
fired units may use a NOx CEMS, as an alternative.  
 ７８
With respect to report frequency, the SO2 Trading in the ARP and the NBP 
require sources to record hourly emissions data and to submit emissions reports to the EPA 
on a quarterly basis, but in RECLAIM, reporting frequency is different according to source 
category: daily for major sources, monthly for large sources, and quarterly for other smaller 
sources. In the area of tracking permits, the three programs are very similar in terms of each 
source’s permits account and electronic tracking system. In the EPA’s SO2 Trading and the 
NOx Budget Trading program, the transfer reporting moved from an early combination of 
paper forms and floppy disks to an electronic (on-line) Allowance Tracking System (ATS) 
over time. In RECLAIM, each transfer of RTC is reported and tracked electronically 
through Web Access To Electronic Reporting System (WATERS)  
 H. Enforcement 
For compliance, penalties should be based on the nature and severity of the 
violation. Above all, the total penalties must be higher than the market price of permits. 
The three programs have similar provisions concerning enforcement: reconciliation or 
grace periods for compliance, penalties such as monetary penalties and allowance 
deductions (offsets), and some estimating method for missing data. For reconciliation, 
RECLAIM and the NBT have two-month window after the end of the compliance year to 
move allowances between accounts to ensure their emissions do not exceed their 
allowances held. The SO2 Trading in the ARP has a shorter grace period of just 30 days. 
Concerning penalties for non-compliance, SO2 trading in the ARP and RECLAIM 
have both higher financial penalties, but allowance deductions from the subsequent year on 
a 1-for-1 basis. However, the NBP has an allowance deduction at a rate of 3-for-1, i.e. each 
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source must submit three allowances per ton of excess emissions in the current year to 
the authority during the next year. In addition, each state can adopt the option of imposing 
financial penalties.   
Comparing financial penalties between SO2 trading in the ARP and RECLAIM, 
penalties in the SO2 Trading in the ARP are as much as three times higher than the 
expected market price of allowances ($2000 per ton in 1990 dollars, adjusted annually for 
inflation) and unit penalties are fixed and applied automatically.  On the other hand, 
penalties in RECLAIM are relatively lower (up to $500 per ton) and unit penalties are 
determined on a case-by-case basis, resulting in uncertainty about the consequences of non-
compliance. Because of the relatively lower penalties and case-by-case determination of 
final penalties, in the period of 1995 through 1999 of RECLAIM, marginal benefits of non-
compliance were higher than their marginal costs (the market price of RTC), which is 
responsible for relatively higher non-compliance rate of individual sources. 
Table 10. Substitution Criteria for CEM Missing Data Periods 
Annual Availability (%) 
of Monitor or System 
Number of Hours 
Missing (N) Value Substituted for Each Missing Hour 
N is less than or 
equal to 24 hours 
Average of the hours recorded before and 
after missing period 
Greater than or equal 
to 95% 
N is greater than 24 hours 
90th percentile value recorded in the 
previous 30 days of service or the 
before/after value, whichever is greater 
N is less than or 
equal to 8 hours 
Average of the hours recorded before and 
after missing period Less than 95% but 
greater than or equal 
to 90% N is greater than 8 hours 
95th percentile value recorded in the 
previous 30 days of service or the 
before/after value, whichever is greater 
Less than 90% N is greater than 0 hours Maximum value recorded in previous 30 days of service 
Source: www.epa.gov/airmarkt/monitoring 
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 Finally, all three programs have similar missing data procedures (MDP) that 
can be implemented when an emission monitoring system fails to yield valid emissions 
data. To avoid intentional suspension of operating the CEMS in periods of peak emissions, 
the double (highly) progressive emissions estimates, which are based on the worst-case 
scenario, are applied for non-monitored periods. The substitute data vary according to the 
duration and frequency of the missing data periods: as the duration of missing data periods 
are shorter, less frequent and the historic monitoring systems are more available, the 
substitute data become less conservative.  
Table 11. Features of Three Major Cap-and-Trade Programs in the US 
Category The SO2 trading in  Acid Rain Program 
Regional Clean Air Incentive 
Market (RECLAIM) 
NOx Budget program 
(NBP) 
<General> 
1. Purpose & framework 
1-1 Purpose  50% reduction in 
acidification 
Attainment of ozone 
standard: 70% reduction in 
ozone precursors 
Attainment of ozone 
standard (ozone season): 
reduction of  ozone 
precursors below 1990   
1-2 Politico-economic      
       Framework 
Uncertain benefits and 
concerns over hotspots 
Excess costs of AQMP 
 in 1989 
Concerns about interstate 
transport of ozone 
2. Coverage 
2-1 Geographical scope National 
except for Alaska, Hawaii 
and Idaho 
Local  
In LA Air Basin  
Multi-jurisdictional  
in 22 eastern states and 
Washington D.C. 
2-2 Implementation 
Years 
Phase I: 1994-1999 
Phase II: 2000- 
1994- Present 
(no phases) 
OTC: 1999-2002 
NBT: 2003/2004(phase 1) 
          2007-2008(phase II) 
(NIER: 2009- ) 
2-3 Covered pollutants SO2 NOx, SOx NOx 
2-4 Affected sources  Electric power plant Electric power plant and 
industrial boilers  
Electric power plant and 
industrial boilers 
<Design issues> 
3. Allocations 
3-1 Initial allocations Grandfathering 
(Average emissions  
1985-1987) 
Grandfathering 
(Peak emissions  
1989-1992) 
Grandfathering 
(to be determined by  
each state) 
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3-2 Baseline for Cap  1980 2003 projection 2007 projection 
3-3 Allocation frequency  Permanent Updated Updated 
3-4 Nature of permits  Allowance (1ton of SO2) 
as actual rights 
RECLAIM Trading Credit 
(lbs. of NOx, SOx) 
as actual rights 
Allowance (1 ton of NOx) 
as actual rights 
4. Trading rules 
4-1 Inter-temporal 
trading 
- Unrestricted banking - No banking, but  over- 
   lapping allowance cycles 
- Limited banking: flow  
  Control 
4-2 Spatial trading - No geographical  
  constraint  
 
- Two trading zones: trade  
prohibited from the inland   
to coastal zone 
- Regardless of three  
   zones, no geographical   
  constraint 
5. Trading market 
5-1 Auctions - Mandatory 
- Public 2.8% 
- Annual 
- Discriminatory 
- Voluntary and private  
- Private offers 
- Semi annual 
- Non-discriminatory 
- Voluntary and private  
- Private offers 
- Semi annual 
- Non-discriminatory 
5-2 Open participation  Open to anyone Open to anyone Open to anyone 
6. Relationship with other Regulations 
6-1 Compatibility with  
       other regulations   
NAAQS, New Source 
Review (RACT) 
NAAQS, New Source 
Review (RACT) 
NAAQS, New Source 
Review (RACT) 
6-2 Incorporation of   
       mobile and other  
       area sources 
No RTCs in the conversion of  
ERC (stationary),  MSERC 
(mobile)  
And ASERC (area) 
Not, but implemented 
with LEV, etc. 
<Implementation issues> 
7. Monitoring  
7-1 Monitoring of  
       Emissions 
- Continuous Emissions  
   Monitoring System  
   (CEMS): hourly data 
   and quarterly reports 
- Major: CEMS (daily) 
- Large: CPMS (monthly) 
- Other process units etc:  
   Fuel meter (quarterly) 
- Continuous Emissions  
   Monitoring System  
   (CEMS): hourly data  
   and quarterly reports 
7-2 Tracking of Permits  
      Transfer 
- Online Allowance    
   Tracking System (ATS) 
 
- Web Access To  
   Electronic Reporting  
   System (WATERS) 
- Online Allowance  
  Tracking System (ATS) 
 
8. Enforcement    
8-1 Reconciliation 
       (Grace periods) 
30 days 2 months 2 months 
8-2 Penalties $2,000 per ton 
Automatic application 
Up to $500 
Determined case by case 
Optional for each state 
8-3 Offsets ratio 1-for-1  1-for-1 3-for-1 
8-4 Emissions estimates  
       for non-monitored  
       periods 
Double progressive 
based on the worst case 
scenario 
Double progressive 
based on the worst case 
scenario 
Double progressive 
based on the worst case 
scenario  
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Comparisons of major Features between Korea and the US 
Drawing on the study of emissions trading programs in Korea and the U.S, in this 
part, two major trading programs, RECLAIM and the new cap-and-trade in Seoul 
(hereafter CATS) are compared: both programs are similar in several aspects: their main 
purpose (reducing urban smog), their geographical scopes (mega-city and its vicinity), their 
covered pollutants (mainly NOx, SOx), and their affected sources (heterogeneous sources 
such as power plants and industrial boilers)    
 A. Purpose and Context 
 In RECLAIM, the Los Angeles Air Basin, the smoggiest area in the U.S., is 
required to achieve federal clean air health standards by 2010. Therefore, traditional 
control plans based on the 1989 Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP) have been in 
effect since the early 1990s. The problem is that anticipated compliance costs imposed on 
businesses were so enormous (up to 13 billion dollars) that there were concerns about a 
possible exodus of regional businesses followed by an economic decline.     
 RECLAIM is a revolutionary compromise between environmental requirements 
and economic needs, i.e., the new market-based tool was a last resort designed to bring 
the region into attainment under the NAAQS without sacrificing huge amounts of 
economic development.  More specifically, the target of RECLAIM includes both a 70% 
reduction in NOx emissions and a 60% reduction in SOx emissions by 2003 through a 
most cost-effective cap-and-trade program.  
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 In CATS, the motive for introducing a new cap-and-trade program comes 
from the perception that traditional CAC regulations, based on technical emissions 
standards, have not been effective in improving air quality in the Seoul Metropolitan 
Area because of steadily increasing numbers of emission sources. Despite numerous 
efforts, such as enhancing the supply of low sulfur and clean fuel and the introduction of 
natural gas vehicles, air quality in terms of NOx and particulate matter has not improved 
throughout 1990s to early 2000s.  
 Like RECLAIM which involved time-consuming collaborations involving 
workshops, feasibility studies and the advisory committees’ efforts, in the development 
of CATS, there were more than one hundred consultations over three years around the 
Joint Task Force involving the MOE, three related local governments, businesses, and 
environmental groups. The direct target of CATS is to reduce more than 40% of NOx and 
PM emissions by 2014.  
 With respect to regulatory styles, Korea and the U.S. are similar in that both 
countries prefer uniform standards rather than site-specific standards, and distrust both 
industry self-regulation and administrative discretion. However, while the US has a 
number of previous emissions trading programs to study and plenty of information is 
freely available, Korea has relatively little experience with market-based tools and the 
availability of information about firms’ abatement technology is limited due to 
confidentiality. Therefore, it seems to be more difficult in Korea to implement an 
emissions trading program, market incentives and any information-based instrument.      
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 B. Market Coverage 
Market coverage is very similar in both programs. RECLAIM covers the Los 
Angeles Basin, SCAQMD’s four-county jurisdiction including Los Angeles County, 
Orange County, Riverside County, and San Bernardino County. Its covered pollutants are 
NOx and SOx, and affected sources encompass all electric plants and industrial boilers 
emitting more than 4 tons of NOx or SOx annually.  
Meanwhile, CATS covers the Seoul Metropolitan area that includes Seoul city, 
Incheon city and the Gyunggi province. This region is adjacent to the Yellow Sea to the 
west. Its covered pollutants include particulate matter as well as NOx and SOx, and 
affected sources are stationary sources including electric plants and industrial boilers. 
Unlike RECLAIM, CATS will be implemented in two phases. In Phase I (July 2007-June 
2009), sources emitting more than 30 ton of NOx, more than 20 tons of SOx, or more than 
1.5 tons of PM will be covered. In Phase II (July 2009-), sources emitting more than 4 tons 
of NOx or SOx, or more than 0.2 tons of PM will be included. In Phase II, SATS shall 
cover about 84 percent of NOx emissions, 78 percent of SOx emissions, and 57 percent of 
PM emissions from stationary sources in the region.      
 C. Design Issues 
In their initial allocation, RECLAIM and CATS take a similar grandfathering 
approaches based on peak emission levels (1989 to 1992, vs. past 5 years) and set their cap 
based on future projection (2003 vs. 2014). Concerning trading rules, both programs have 
some restrictions on geographical or temporal flexibility. RECLAIM divides the region 
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into two trading zones, and trading from the inland zone to the coastal zone is 
prohibited. Also, RECLAIM does not allow banking, but has only two overlapping 
allowance cycles as a limited banking system. On the other hand, CATS has no 
geographical constraints on allowance trading, but trading volumes permitted  for each 
source are limited to a certain fraction of its allocated allowances. Specifically, tradable 
allowances are restricted 20 percent in the starting year, 30 percent in the second and third 
year, and then 50 percent in the fourth and last year every five compliance year. Also, any 
source that wants to trade its allowances with other sources must turn in an application to 
the MOE at least 30 days before the trading day. 
As for temporal flexibility, like the NBP, CATS allows banking but there are 
automatic limits imposed on the use of banked allowances when the total number of 
allowances banked for all sources exceeds 10 percent of the allowance cap for the next 
year. In addition to that, the MOE can limit the transfer of allowances when the transfer 
may result in a violation of ambient air quality standards.  
With respect to trading markets, neither RECLAIM nor CATS has a provision 
about mandatory auctions, so auctions are run in the private sector. As RECLAIM overlays 
the NAAQS and the RACT requirement of New Source Review (NSR), CATS also 
coexists with several pre-existing regulations such as emissions standards, emissions 
charges and restrictions on fuel usage. RECLAIM, unlike CATS, stipulates several offset 
programs: RTCs generated from the conversion of Mobile Source ERCs and Area Source 
ERCs can be used; Rules in RECLAIM also permit inter-pollutant or inter-District offsets.      
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 D. Implementation Issues 
With respect to monitoring, major sources under both RECLAIM and CATS 
monitor emissions using CEMS (in RECLAIM) and TMS (in CATS) respectively. 
However, while RECLAIM employs an electronic reporting system called WATERS, 
CATS will rely initially on conventional paper-formed reports in earlier years. 
Concerning enforcement, both programs have several similarities: each source is 
given a two-month grace period for reconciliation and; financial penalties, as well as 
allowance deduction, are imposed.  On the other hand, RECLAIM and CATS have 
differences in some respects: while RECLAIM has an allowance deduction at a rate of 1-
for-1, CATS has a progressive rate based on the number of prior violation. Financial 
penalties under RECLAIM are imposed case-by-case, but those under CATS are imposed 
according to a prescribed formula. Finally, unlike RECLAIM, there are no provisions 
concerning missing data procedures built into the protocols for CATS.   
Table 12. Comparison of RECLAIM and the Cap-and-Trade Program in Seoul 
Category Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (RECLAIM) 
The cap-and-trade program in Seoul 
(CATS)  
1. Purpose & Contexts  
1-1 Purpose  Attainment of ozone standard: 70% 
reduction in ozone precursors 
Reducing more than 40% of NOx and 
PM emissions by 2014 
1-2 Politico-economic     
       Framework 
Excess costs of Air Quality 
Management Plan (AQMP) in 1989 
Limitation of emissions standards to 
deal with serious air pollution due to 
increasing number of sources 
2. Market Coverage 
2-1 Geographical scope Local in LA Air Basin  The Seoul Metropolitan Area  including 
Seoul, Incheon, and Gyunggi province 
2-2 Implementation 
      Years 
1994- Present Phase I: July 2007-June 2009  
Phase II: July 2009- 
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2-3 Covered pollutants NOx, Sox NOx, SOx and PM 
2-4 Affected sources  Electric power plant and industrial 
boilers  
Electric power plant and industrial 
boilers 
3. Design Issues 
3-1 Initial allocations Grandfathering 
(peak emissions 1989-1992) 
Grandfathering 
(peak emissions over past 5 years) 
3-2 baseline for the cap  2003 projection 2014 projection 
3-3 Inter-temporal  
       Trading 
No banking, but two overlapping 
allowances cycles 
Limited banking: flow control 
3-4 Spatial trading Two trading zones: trade prohibited  
from inland to coastal zone 
No geographical constraints 
3-5. Trading market - Voluntary and private  
- Semi annual 
- Non-discriminatory 
No provisions 
3-6 Compatibility with  
       pre-existing  
       regulations   
- NAAQS 
- New Source Review (RACT) 
- National air quality standards 
- emissions standard 
- emissions charges & fuel regulations 
3-7 Incorporation into  
       mobile and  
       area sources 
RTCs generated from the conversion of 
ERC(stationary source) and STC 
including MSERC(mobile source) and 
ASERC(area source) 
Not, but implemented with LEV etc. 
4. Monitoring and Enforcement   
4-1 Monitoring and     
      Reporting of  
      Emissions 
- Major sources: CEMS (daily) 
- Large sources: CPMS (monthly) 
- Other process units etc: Fuel meter  
   (quarterly) 
- Tele Metering System (TMS): every  
five minute monitoring  
(monthly reports) 
4-2  Reporting type Web Access To Electronic Reporting  
System (WATERS) 
Paper reports 
4-3 Reconciliation 
      (grace period) 
2 months 2 months 
4-4 Financial Penalties Up to $500 
(Determined case by case) 
Not fixed 
(Determined case by case) 
4-5 Offsets of excess  
      Emissions 
1-for-1 3-for-1 
4-6 Missing Data  
      Procedures (MDP) 
Double progressive 
based on the worst case scenario 
No provisions 
 
 
 
 ８８
 
 
V. Conclusion  
Major principles of emissions trading system 
 An emissions trading program can be likened to a building supported by three 
pillars: environmental certainty, economic efficiency (cost-effectiveness), and political 
feasibility. If one of the three pillars is not in place, the whole system of an emissions 
trading program cannot work smoothly. Major principles guiding emissions trading 
programs can be drawn from these three pillars: simplicity, predictability, accountability, 
transparency and collaboration.   
Figure 21. Relationship between Three Pillars and Five Principles in a Trading System 
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 A. Simplicity 
 As many researchers argue (Stavins, 2000; Ellerman et al., 2000), simplicity is the 
most basic and important principle in designing an emissions trading program. The 
attempt to deal with other problems, such as equity and local concentrated pollution, is 
likely to impose complex restrictions on affected sources, which undermines the powerful 
merit of the trading program. Earlier EPA emissions trading systems and wetlands credit 
sales in the U.S. are perfect examples of emissions trading programs imposing highly 
complicated restrictions on sources. Complexity tends to imply greater information 
needs, time-consuming decision-making, and controversial debates that may lead to 
unnecessarily higher transaction costs for both the regulatory authority and the regulated 
pollution sources. 
 Concerning simplicity, interexchangeability (on 1-for-1 basis regardless of 
geographical origin etc.) and flexibility of allowances is especially important. If the 
market value of a traded allowance varies depending on its geographical origin, generated 
year, or allowance banking opportunities, transaction costs would increase and the overall 
social net benefits (savings) from allowance trading would lower. As well as 
interexchangeability, flexibility is another dimension of affecting simplicity. Any 
geographical or temporal constraint on allowance trading from concerns over hot spots 
and environmental injustice may detract from the cost-effectiveness of the system. 
Although there may be a trade-off between environmental concerns and cost-
effectiveness, a society should make an effort to balance these two values based on 
simplicity (flexibility).         
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 According to the EPA (2003), the principle of simplicity can be applied to 
almost all elements of the emissions trading programs, such as: applicability, allocations 
formulas, monitoring, reporting and enforcement.                   
 B. Predictability 
 Predictability is another principle guiding an effective emissions trading program.  
Emissions trading systems were created based on the concept of markets’ well-defined 
property rights (Coase 1960; Dales 1966). For emissions trading to operate appropriately, 
reductions in emissions should be regarded and protected as legal or actual property 
rights. Unless the economic value of emissions reductions is guaranteed on a long-term 
basis, no sources have incentives to reduce their emissions under the sources’ 
requirements and invest in innovation that will reduce their marginal abatement costs.  
 To sustain predictability of a trading system, rules including allocation formulas 
should be set on a long-term basis, and any changes in the rules must be clear, and 
consistent across all affected sources. 
 C. Accountability 
 Accountability is important in achieving environmental integrity of the trading 
program. Flexibility provides regulated sources lots of freedom to choose abatement 
instruments. As responsibility may well comes with freedom, accountability is required 
to check and balance flexibility in allowance trading. Accountability can be ensured 
through accurate and consistent monitoring and effective enforcement. Even if there are 
considerable compliance costs for each source, the continuous emissions monitoring 
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system (CEMS) has been widely adopted and can greatly enhance accountability. In 
terms of enforcement, penalties for non-compliance should be high enough, and should 
apply automatically (i.e. with great certainty) to discourage each source from violating its 
requirement.   
 D. Transparency  
 Transparency concerns the full and open disclosure of related decision-making 
including the process of making all trading rules, the transfer of permits, open 
participation in auctions, and treatment of non-compliant sources. Transparency is 
important to both businesses and the public: for businesses, it helps determine behaviors 
such as bidding prices in auctions, investment plans, and trading or banking of unused 
permits; for the public, it can enhance both public acceptance and environmental 
attainment. Emissions data and available technology in industries should be disclosed and 
open to the authorities and the public, as long as they are not highly confidential to 
businesses.  
 E. Collaboration 
 Recently, collaborative approaches have been widely considered as a new and 
effective tool to deal with difficult problems involving conflicting interests in a number 
of environmental policy areas. Collaboration refers to a consensus-building process 
through which a wide range of participants can constructively explore their differences 
and search for new solutions that go beyond their own limited interests. It has numerous 
advantages over the conventional top-down approaches including: learning and educating 
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participants, flexibility in inventing solutions, building-up of social capital, and 
higher implementability (Gray, 1989).  
 However, collaboration is not a panacea. There can be several circumstances in 
which collaborative approaches are most appropriate: (1) problems are bigger than any 
single entity alone can solve (“indivisible problems”); (2) traditional approaches have 
limitations to solve current problems; (3) there are increasing environmental turbulence; 
(4) there are no insurmountable obstacles, including ideological differences, 
constitutional issues, unilateral power concentration by one stakeholder, historical 
antagonism (Gray 1985, 1989, Julian 1994). 
 Collaboration seems especially appropriate for cap-and-trade programs. First, 
since permits are de facto property rights, many elements of trading systems (including 
scope and initial allocations) may well be contentious among stakeholders and cannot be 
solved by one participant. Second, most cap-and-trade programs was introduced as a last 
resort to solve problems associated with higher compliance costs and environmental 
uncertainty which traditional CAC regulations did not deal with effectively. Third, with 
increasing number of sources and technical uncertainty, environmental turbulence has 
increased. Finally, there are no critical obstacles in introducing cap-and-trade programs. 
Most contentious issues (including initial allocations and restriction on trade) can be 
solved through negotiations among stakeholders.   
 In particular, in the case of a nation like Korea where CAC approaches have been 
dominant, it is much more difficult to introduce an emissions trading program, so the 
principle of collaboration to overcome political obstacles is more important in designing 
any trading program. 
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Lessons learned from experiences with U.S. emissions trading 
Based on three decades of experience with five emissions trading programs in the 
US, lessons to be drawn can be divided into three categories: general lessons for 
environmental policy, lessons for design, and lessons for implementation.    
 A. General Lessons for environmental policy 
There are three general lessons for environmental policy. First, emissions trading 
systems work if they are well designed in terms of the five principles discussed above. 
Well-designed trading programs can reduce compliance costs considerably compared to 
traditional CAC regulations. Active transfer of permits among sources with different 
marginal abatement costs (MAC) is observable evidence that allows one to infer cost 
savings from trading. In addition to cost savings, emissions trading programs are able to 
achieve environmental targets with a greater certainty. Under an emissions trading 
program, more aggressive emission reduction targets can be phased in and earlier emission 
reduction can be accelerated by way of banking. In particular, emissions trading systems 
can prevent some sources from resorting to requests for special exemptions from emissions 
reduction targets based on their technical or financial hardship, as is often the case under 
traditional CAC schemes.      
Second, even if emissions trading systems are widely regarded as very powerful 
market-based instruments for dealing with air pollution, they are not a cure-all. In some 
cases, trading programs will be the best instrument, but in some cases, other instruments, 
such as traditional CAC may remain more suitable. In general, emissions trading systems 
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function well especially when: the environmental or health concern emerges over a 
relatively large area; environmental damage from air pollution is not critical at small 
concentrations; a number of sources are involved in creating the environmental problem;  
marginal abatement costs vary across sources; and emissions can be measured with 
sufficient accuracy and consistency. 
Third, if possible, cap and trade programs based on absolute baselines are more 
desirable than project-based and rate-based trading programs involving relative baselines. 
As with EPA’s emissions trading programs, rate-based programs generate significant 
transaction costs because emissions reduction credits (ERCs) have to be identified through 
a case-by-case pre-approval. Additionally, project-based and rate-based trading programs 
do not ensure total emissions reduction with certainty because reductions are credited from 
unspecified or relative baselines.      
 B. Lessons for Design of a trading system 
There are four lessons concerning the design of an emissions trading program. First, 
opportunity for banking plays a crucial role in enhancing cost savings and achieving 
environmental targets. Banking provides temporal flexibility for affected sources, so 
banking not only reduces compliance costs, but it also accelerates earlier emissions 
reduction for future use. In addition, as can be seen from the experience with RECLAIM in 
2000, an emissions trading program without banking system cannot deal as effectively with 
price volatility stemming from uncertainty. In fact, the price surge in NOx RTCs caused by 
California’s electricity crisis beginning in mid 2000 led to firms exceeding the NOx 
RECLAIM cap by about 6% and led to a temporary suspension of RECLAIM. If banking 
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was allowed in RECLAIM, as it is in the SO2 Trading Program, these problems might 
have been avoided or at least much lessened.   
Second, whatever strategy is adopted, the initial allocation of permits cannot 
significantly undermine an emissions trading program’s performance, even though it may 
have distributional consequences. To date, in almost every case, emissions trading 
programs (such as the SO2 Trading Program and RECLAIM) have adopted a 
grandfathering approach rather than alternative approaches based on auctions. This has 
been due to political acceptability. The auctioning approach has several advantages over 
grandfathering approach: it produces government revenue for recycling, and given the 
presence of transaction costs, the initial allocation would affect the final equilibrium 
allocation and thus total cost-savings. However, the difference in cost savings between 
auctions and grandfathering are very small, so that in practice, the different methods of 
initial allocation of permits minimally influence performance in the trading program.      
Third, the evaluation of opt-in provisions is mixed. While voluntary participation in 
an emissions trading program would reduce abatement costs, it may also lead to overly 
generous allocation of permits due to adverse selection problems. In the case of the SO2 
Trading Program, the losses from excess allocation of permits may have offset the gains 
from lower emission control costs, resulting in little net contribution to the overall 
performance of the program.  
Fourth, once emissions trading programs are properly designed, markets can 
develop privately and as a result, governmental interventions should be minimized. In 
theory, any type of restriction on trade, including pre-approving trades, would increase 
transaction costs and detract from the program’s viability. However, in practice, given 
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political concerns over possible hot spots and concentration of permits under some 
groups, there may be some restrictions based on geography. Restrictions should be kept to 
minimum and should be removed over time if they prove to be inessential.   
 C. Lessons for Implementation of a trading system 
With regard to implementation issues, three lessons can be identified. First, total 
emissions at sources should be measured as accurately and consistently as possible. 
Emissions measurements are like the “gold standard’ of tradable permits, so accurate and 
consistent measurements help create a perception of fairness for every participant. In the 
case of the SO2 Trading Program, while measurement accounts for roughly 7 % of total 
compliance costs, CEMS technology enhances confidence and contributes to the success of 
the program.   
 Second, reliable enforcement is essential for compliance. In most cap-and-trade 
programs, both financial penalties and deductions against future permits are employed at 
the same time. In using enforcement, two factors should be considered: the optimal level 
(“severity”) of penalties and the automatic application (“certainty”) of those penalties. It 
is important to set the optimal level of penalties because insufficient penalties are not 
effective in discouraging non-compliance by sources. However, an overly severe level 
may cause political difficulties in implementation. In addition to the penalty level, it is 
important that penalties be applied automatically. As with RECLAIM, if penalties are 
applied through case-by-case review, it increases uncertainty of penalties and is less 
effective in ensuring compliance. Firms respond to the expected penalty, which reflects 
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not only the size of the penalty if they are detected and prosecuted for violations, but 
also the odds of being detected and successfully prosecuted.              
Third, emissions trading systems should be compatible with pre-existing 
regulations. In virtually every case, emissions trading programs have been implemented in 
contexts where they overlap with other regulations, such as NAAQS, and the RACT 
requirements of NSR. Actually, the presence of pre-existing regulations is an apparent 
prerequisite for a successful emissions trading program. Under emissions trading systems, 
political conflict may be more contentious than under traditional CAC scheme due to 
uncertainty. The presence of CAC regulations can help provide information and a practical 
reference of regulations, both of which are necessary to reach a political compromise that 
permits introduction of an emissions trading systems.  
For example, regardless of time-consuming debates, the exclusion of VOCs in 
RECLAIM was accountable for by the absence of regulations on VOCs. Moreover, in 
many cases, without provisions for geographical restrictions on trade, overlapping 
regulations can be served as a backstop that prevents the formation of hotspots that violate 
air quality standards. As shown in the cases of the UK and Poland, incompatibility between 
new trading programs and pre-existing regulations may well lead to the failure of the 
emissions trading program. Therefore, attention to the incorporation of emissions trading 
programs into current regulatory systems is important, especially in countries like Korea 
where CAC regulations have been the dominant form of regulation in environmental 
policies.  
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Table 13. Summary of Lessons Learned from Experiences with Major Emissions 
Trading Programs in the U.S. 
General Lessons for environmental policy 
Lesson 1: Emissions trading systems work both in terms of cost-savings and environmental 
goals if they are well-designed, based on a number of principles. 
Lesson 2: Regardless of successful cases in dealing with air pollution, an emissions trading 
system is not a cure-all. In other words, there are situations under which 
emissions trading programs do not function well.  
Lesson 3: Cap-and-trade programs grounded on absolute baselines are more desirable than 
project-based based and rate-based trading programs that are grounded on 
relative baselines. 
Lessons for Design 
Lesson 4: Banking (i.e. temporal flexibility) plays a crucial role in enhancing cost savings, 
achieving environmental targets, and reducing price volatility.  
Lesson 5: Whatever allocations method is used, the initial allocation of permits cannot 
significantly undermine an emissions trading program’s performance. 
Lesson 6: Evaluation of opt-in provisions is mixed. While voluntary participation in trading 
programs can reduce overall abatement costs, it may also lead to overly 
generous allocation of permits due to adverse selection problems. 
Lesson 7: Once emissions trading programs are properly designed, markets can develop. 
Governmental interventions should be minimized as much as possible.   
Lessons for Implementation 
Lesson 8: Total emissions should be measured as accurately and consistently as possible. 
Lesson 9: Reliable enforcement is essential in compliance. 
Lesson 10: Emissions trading systems should be compatible with pre-existing regulations. 
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Implications for Seoul, Korea 
Turning to the research questions in the introduction, the main purpose of this study 
is to draw lessons from experiences with emissions trading programs in the US, and then, 
based on those lessons, to provide implications to use in assessing the design and 
implementation of the new cap-and-trade program which is scheduled to begin in July 2007 
in the Seoul Metropolitan Area in Korea.     
As is often the case, even the most successful policy in one country can totally fail 
in other countries if context is not fully taken into consideration. Therefore, suggestions in 
this part are provided given the specific context in Korea, even if many of principles and 
lessons drawn from the experiences in the US can be applied without significant 
modifications. 
 A. Minimizing governmental intervention  
Since an emissions trading system is a market-based instrument intended to provide 
affected sources with the flexibility to adopt abatement alternatives, its performance can be 
enhanced by a well-functioning market. Therefore, minimal governmental intervention in 
the emissions trading program is desirable. However, distributional or equity/justice-related 
concerns are likely to lead to governmental interventions with respect to the transfer of 
some permits, especially in a country like Korea in which CAC regulations have been 
dominant in environmental policies. 
According to the legal framework of CATS, all sources that wish to trade 
allowances must submit allocation forms to the proper authority and receive pre-approval 
of each transfer. If the transfer of allowances might lead to a violation of ambient air 
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quality standards or create an excessive local concentration in a specific area, the 
trade cannot be allowed. In addition, the proportion of a firm’s allowances that are tradable 
is limited to 20 percent to 50 percent annually: 20 percent for starting year, 30 percent for 
the second and third years, and 50 percent for the fourth and fifth years.  
While these restrictions on trade may reduce environmental concerns, they will also 
limit the potential gains from emissions trading systems. Consequently, current pre-
approval requirements and annual limitations of transferable allowances, as excessive 
governmental interventions, should probably be reconsidered. Without both pre-approval 
and annual limitations of transferable allowances, existing emissions standards can serve as 
a backstop for dealing with environmental concerns.  
 B. Relaxing Restrictions on Banking   
Even if banking under CATS is similar to that of the NOx Budget Trading 
Program, banking in CATS is more limited: that is, when the total number of allowances 
banked for all sources does not exceed 10 percent of the total regional budget for the next 
year, the available amount of banked allowances is determined by multiplying the total 
number of allowances banked by 0.5; when the total number of allowances banked for all 
sources exceeds 10 percent of the total regional budget for the next year, the useable 
amount of banked allowances is more complicated. It is determined according to the 
following formula: 
Ab(t+1) = Ab(t)× 0.5× 0.1× (total allowances banked for all sources ÷ total unused   
allowances for all sources. 
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where 
Ab(t+1)  =  the available amount of banked allowances of source A for the next year, 
and Ab(t)  =  the unused allowances of source A for a specific year.   
Compared to other emissions trading programs in the US, banking options in CATS 
appears to be restrictive. As a result, some of the advantages of a well-designed emissions 
trading program-- i.e., gains from banking (including earlier emission reduction, cost 
savings from temporal flexibility, and a safe valve for price volatility)-- will be foregone.       
As in the case of restrictions on the transfer of allowances, the excessive and 
complicated restrictions on banking should be relaxed in pursuit of simplicity. If there are 
still concerns about weakening or delaying environmental achievement, then other tools, 
such as the adoption of a more aggressive emissions target, should be considered instead of 
inordinate restrictions on banking.   
 C. Creating Public Auction 
Even if grandfathering has prevailed as a politically viable method for, auctions 
have their own advantages including recycling revenue and long-term efficiency. In the 
development of an emissions trading system, there would be concerns among regulated 
sources about the emergence of a trading market and equilibration to one market price. 
Public auctions in the earlier stage of an emissions trading program can be the answer to 
these concerns because they can facilitate convergence to one market price for allowances 
and thus promote the development of a market.  
Furthermore, just as the EPA in the SO2 Trading Program auctions 2.8 percent of 
total allowances, setting aside some portion of all allowances for auction can limit the 
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potential market power of some larger allowance holders, and give new entrants or 
smaller players an opportunity to buy allowances. Therefore, it is desirable to set aside 
some small portion of each firm’s allowances for an MOE-administered auction, at least 
until the market is mature. 
 D. Introduction of Opt-in Provisions   
 Unlike under the SO2 Trading Program and RECLAIM, CATS allows voluntary 
agreement that enables each regulated source to choose more rigorous emissions 
allowances voluntarily, but does not have an opt-in program by unregulated sources. As 
discussed in previous chapters, opt-in (i.e., unregulated sources’ voluntary participation 
in a trading program) has mixed impacts on the emissions trading program: it reduce 
compliance costs among sources, but it could provide introduce excessively generous 
allowances into the program, resulting in a weakening of environmental quality (For 
example, consider the “hot air” problem associated with Russian allowances in nascent 
carbon-trading to limit climate change).  
Despite short-term environmental setbacks, long-term benefits seem to be 
considerable seeing that opt-in can be used not only to reduce costs, but also to extend the 
applicability of the caps by involving additional previously unregulated sources. As a 
result, it is probably desirable to introduce an opt-in provisions into CATS.      
 E. Accurate and Consistent Monitoring 
To monitor emissions accurately and consistently, CATS requires larger sources 
subject to Phase I (July 2007 through June 2009) to install a tele-monitoring system (TMS) 
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that is similar to the CEMS in the SO2 Trading Program and RECLAIM. Before 
CATS is applied to mid- or smaller-sized sources in Phase II starting July 2009, TMS 
“saturation” should be extensive. Unlike the SO2 Trading Program and RECLAIM, 
currently CATS has no provisions for missing data procedures (MDP). Therefore, to deter 
intentional powering-down of the monitoring system during periods of peak emissions, 
conservative substitutes based on the worst case scenario should be applied for non-
monitoring periods.    
 F. Effective Enforcement  
Concerning enforcement, there are two things to consider. First, financial penalties 
under CATS are imposed on a case-by-case administrative review, which leads to 
uncertainty about penalties and the possibility of non-compliance when only expected 
penalties determine firms’ behavior. Therefore, the method of levying penalties must 
change from case-by-case reviews to automatic imposition.  
In addition to financial penalties, non-compliant sources are subject to allowance 
deductions from the next year’s allocated allowances, prorated based on the number of 
violations for the five preceding compliance years: emissions in excess of allowances are 
multiplied by a factor determined by the number of recent violations, such as 1.2 for 2 
violations, 1.5 for 3 violations, and 1.8 for 4 violations. In pursuit of simplicity, deduction 
rates for penalties should be simplified to a 1-for-1 basis and additional financial penalties 
should be adjusted so that the expected penalty is high enough to deter violations.      
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The penalty rate is one of the most important factors in sources’ 
compliance. The current per-unit penalties should be reviewed periodically to determine 
whether they are too low compared to the possible market price of allowances or actual 
abatement costs.   
 G. Compatibility with Pre-existing Regulations 
As Schwarze and Zappel (1999) point out, the context in terms of pre-existing 
and/or overlapping regulations is one of the major common features to consider for the 
design of applied tradable permits. The UK and Poland cases are the perfect example to 
show that compatibility with pre-existing regulations is one key to the success of an 
emissions trading system. 
Drawing on current air pollution control measure described in chapter III, three 
types of conventional regulations are directly related to CATS: emission standards, an 
emission charge, and fuel regulations. First, emission standards can complement an 
emissions trading system. Even if an emissions trading program can cap the total emissions 
in the region, it is often necessary to set maximum emissions limits for specific sources in 
order to prevent short-term over-pollution. For example, the SO2 Trading Program has been 
in effect at the same time as the BACT requirements of the New Source Review (NSR).  
Second, emissions charges can be unnecessarily duplicated with an emissions 
trading system. In the current framework of emissions charges, there are two kinds of 
emissions charges: general charges imposed on sources emitting SO2 or PM10 according to 
their total emissions, and; additional charge imposed on sources emitting 10 pollutants 
including SO2, PM10, and NH3 which exceed the emission standards. Affected sources 
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subject to CATS are exempt from the general charges, but this exemption is not 
sufficient because additional charges can be duplicated with penalties in an emissions 
trading program. Hence, all sources covered by CATS should be exempt from all emissions 
charges.  
Third, fuel regulations are also unnecessary as overlapping regulations. In the legal 
framework for CATS, sources emitting SO2 are exempted from limits on sulfur content in 
their fuels. To increase flexibility of CATS, besides CAC regulations concerning the use of 
low-sulfur fuel, regulations mandating the use of clean fuels should not apply to firms 
participating in CATS.  
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Table 14. Summary of Implications for the Cap-and-Trade Program in Seoul 
Implications for reforming CATS 
A.  Minimizing Governmental Intervention 
- Current pre-approval requirements and annual limitations of transferable allowances, as 
excessive governmental interventions, should be repealed. 
B.  Relaxing the Restrictions on Banking   
- The excessive and complicated restrictions on banking (under the current framework, at 
most 50 percent of banked allowances can be used in trade) should be relaxed to enhance 
simplicity in terms of environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. 
C.  Creating a Public Auction 
- Some portions of allowances (i.e. 2.8%) should be set aside for MOE- administered 
auctions, at least until the market is mature. 
D.  Introduction of Opt-in Provisions   
- It is desirable to introduce provisions that allow sources to “opt-in” to CATS in order to 
improve cost savings and extending the caps by involving currently unregulated sources. 
E.  Accurate and Consistent Monitoring 
- TMS, a continuous emissions monitoring system, should be expanded into mid- or 
smaller-sized sources. 
- To avoid intentional powering down of monitoring systems in peak times, missing data 
procedures (MDP) should be introduced into CATS. 
F.  Effective Enforcement  
- Financial penalties should be imposed from case-by-case reviews to automatic 
applications.   
- Deduction rates for penalties should be simplified to 1-for-1 basis, given the presence of 
additional financial penalties. 
- The current per-unit penalties must be reviewed to determine whether they are sufficient, 
compared to the possible market price of allowances or actual abatement costs.     
G.  Compatibility with Pre-existing Regulations 
- Emissions standards should be maintained as it is. 
- All affected sources should be exempt from all emissions charges and fuel regulations in 
order to avoid unnecessary duplicated regulations. 
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Final Discussion 
Based on experiences with major cap-and-trade programs in the U.S., it is clarified 
that a well-designed cap-and-trade program has advantages, both in terms of environmental 
certainty and economic efficiency, over a traditional CAC approach. Along with the trend 
towards increasing reliance on market-based incentives across the globe, emissions trading 
schemes are likely to play an increasing role in controlling pollution as an alternative tool 
to existing CAC regulations.  
As many previous researchers argue, however, emissions trading schemes cannot 
be a cure-all for a variety of environmental problems. The advantages of an emissions 
trading program can be maximized only if it is applied in appropriate conditions: (1) 
concerning pollutants, uniformly mixed pollutants, such as CO2, are appropriate, but toxic 
chemicals which cause serious risk to neighboring residents are not suitable for emissions 
trading systems; (2) there should be a sufficient number of sources with different marginal 
abatement costs; (3) it should be practical and inexpensive to measure emissions and 
enforce trading (Ellerman et. al., 2000, Tietenberg 2003) 
In addition to the above general conditions, an emissions trading program should 
take into account that each country has specific economic, political, and regulatory settings. 
If it is adopted without modification corresponding with different settings, an emissions 
trading program that succeeded in one country, can fail in another country.                    
To become a dominant regulatory policy tool, emissions trading schemes should 
deal with several concerns (including hot-spots and concentration of market power) without 
sacrificing its advantages through excessive governmental involvement or intervention. 
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In the case of CATS in Korea, environmental concerns lead to excessive 
governmental intervention, complex restrictions on trading, and duplicated enforcement 
with pre-existing regulations, which may damage the potential cost savings from CATS.  
At present, this study on the CATS was done theoretically. However, after the 
implementation of the CATS starting in July 2007, the empirical studies to evaluate CATS 
will be needed.     
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AQMP: Air Quality Management Plan 
ARP: Acid Rain Program 
ATS: Allowance Tracking System 
BACT: Best Available Control Technology 
CAA: Clean Air Act 
CAIR: Clean Air Interstate Rule 
CATS: Cap-and-Trade Program in Seoul 
CEMS: Continuous Emissions Monitoring System 
CPMS: Continuous Process Monitoring System 
DOC: Diesel Oxidation Catalysts 
DPF: Diesel Particulate Filters 
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency 
LEV: Low Emission Vehicles/ ZEV: Low Emission Vehicles 
MDP: Missing Date Procedures 
MOE: Ministry of Environment 
NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standard  
NBT: NOx Budget Trading Program  
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NGV: Natural Gas Vehicles 
NOx: Nitrogen Oxides/ PM: Particulate Matter/ SO2: Sulfur Dioxides 
NSPS: New Source Performance Standard 
NSR: New Source Review 
OECD: Organization for Environmental Cooperation and Development 
OTC: Ozone Transport Commission 
RACT: Reasonable Available Control Technology 
REC: RECLAIM Emission Credit 
RECLAIM: Regional Clean Air Incentive Market 
SMAQMDO: Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Management District Office 
SCAQMD: South Coast Air Quality Management District 
TAPL: Total Air Pollution Load 
TEC: Total Emission Control 
TMS: Tele-Monitoring System 
VOC: Volatile Organic Compounds 
WATER: Web Access To Electronic Reporting System 
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APPENDIX B 
 
THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT  
IN KOREA  
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